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ABSTRACT 
In 2009, the United States and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) concluded a nuclear 
cooperation agreement which contained a commitment on the part of the U.A.E. not to 
enrich uranium through its own domestic programs. Dubbed the “Gold Standard” of 
nuclear nonproliferation by the Obama administration, such an accomplishment has not 
been repeated in nuclear agreements between 2009 and 2015. This paper examines 
American nuclear cooperation negotiations following the establishment of the “Gold 
Standard,” and argues that the rapid reversal of American negotiating policy toward 
enrichment and reprocessing technologies will hinder U.S. nonproliferation goals going 
forward. 
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1 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
In 2009, the United States and the United Arab Emirates concluded a nuclear 
cooperation agreement which contained one very unusual clause: the United Arab 
Emirates would agree not to enrich uranium through domestic programs, requiring it 
instead to import enriched uranium from abroad. This commitment has since been 
referred to as the “Gold Standard” of nuclear nonproliferation. In the nearly six years 
since that agreement was signed, the United States has embarked on several nuclear 
cooperation negotiations with a variety of countries around the world. The “Gold 
Standard” has not been achieved in any of these subsequent negotiations. 
At the conclusion of its negotiations, Vietnam agreed to a less-strict alternative. 
This was partly an outcome of the United States’ own choosing, having determined in 
2012 that it should approach restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing on a case-by-
case basis. Vietnam set the “Silver Standard” in 2014 when it made a political, but not 
legally binding, pledge to forego enrichment capacity.  
Even among countries with which the United States maintains positive relations 
and considers to be of minimal proliferation risk, a non-enrichment clause is a unique 
feature of a nuclear cooperation agreement. It is unlikely that if a country poses a 
significant military or proliferation threat it will sign a legally-binding non-enrichment 
clause, particularly if such a clause is rare among close American cooperative partners. 
This makes the “Gold Standard” of nuclear nonproliferation an elusive goal, but one 
which has been proven to be obtainable. 
2 
By its very nature, a nuclear cooperation agreement cannot be undertaken solely 
by one country. It is a partnership wherein two countries agree that the supply of nuclear 
materials, technologies, and facilities by one to the other is beneficial to the advancement 
of the interests of both parties. The United States has signed nuclear cooperation 
agreements – called “123 Agreements” based on the requirements of Section 123 of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 – with more than fifty countries and entities around the 
world, either individually or through an agreement with bodies such as Euratom.
1
  
In the United States, these cooperation agreements are essential legal frameworks 
for American businesses to export nuclear technologies and materials. The drawback is 
the dual-use nature of nuclear material; sensitive nuclear technologies and processes 
inherently run the risk of being applied to advance nuclear weapons programs. Although 
multilateral regimes and international treaties attempt to limit the spread of dangerous 
nuclear technologies, the risk of proliferation remains the utmost concern when entering 
into an agreement with a new partner.  
There are warning signs that a partner country may be interested in a nuclear 
program that is less than peaceful. A fully self-contained nuclear fuel cycle infrastructure 
is expensive and cumbersome to develop, and is simply not economically feasible for 
nations operating a small number of standard civilian nuclear reactors. Research reactors, 
which required the more dangerous high-enriched uranium during the Cold War era, can 
be modified with today’s technology to operate on the same, more proliferation-resistant, 
fuel used in civilian nuclear reactors. However, the presence of such warning signs does 
not automatically mean that a country has begun developing nuclear weapons. A 
                                               
1
 Issues & Policy, “Nuclear Cooperation Agreements,” Nuclear Energy Institute, 2015. Accessed August 
28, 2015, http://www.nei.org/Issues-Policy/Exports-Trade/Nuclear-Cooperation-Agreements.  
3 
perceived scarcity in supply or even the choice of a nation to exercise its right under the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to pursue civilian nuclear programs are examples of a 
valid justification to pursue either a self-contained nuclear fuel cycle or a research reactor 
which requires high-enriched uranium fuel. 
As such, a nuclear cooperation agreement undertaken by the United States is 
traditionally a tightly-written document designed to ensure that the United States is not 
inadvertently contributing to military programs. Much like an understanding of the 
nuclear fuel cycle, the framework of nuclear cooperation agreements must be examined 
to appreciate the significance of the “Gold Standard.” Furthermore, agreements in this 
area signed after the “Gold Standard” are essential to tracing the evolution of U.S. 
attempts at advancing its nonproliferation agenda. With this context, the specific nuclear 
cooperation agreements signed between the United States and the United Arab Emirates, 
and between the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, may be examined 
to build a better understanding of how the agreements evolved. 
Finally, a return to the legal basis of nuclear cooperation agreements emanating 
from the United States will be shown through attempts by Congress to mandate stricter 
nonproliferation controls in the agreement framework. Despite multiple attempts over 
several years and congresses, Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 has proven 
highly difficult to amend. As with all complex issues, this stems from a wide variety of 
factors, but likely includes concerns that overly restrictive agreements will make the 
United States less widely used among international suppliers, thus undermining U.S. 
commercial interests and eroding American influence in the global nonproliferation 
environment. 
4 
The end result has been that through half a decade of nuclear negotiations, the 
United States has moved progressively farther away from the “Gold Standard.” In so 
doing, the United States has eroded its position that the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons does not grant signatory states the inherent right to enrich uranium. It 
has similarly sent a signal that civilian infrastructures capable of producing nuclear 
weapons components, such as enrichment facilities, are not inherently dangerous 
technologies. 
This is most easily exemplified with the recently-concluded Iran Nuclear 
Negotiations. Although not a 123 Agreement, it nonetheless falls within the scope of 
these frameworks due to its effects on Iran’s civilian nuclear enterprise. The Iran deal 
allows Iran to enrich uranium, which is completely contrary to the “Gold Standard” of 
nonproliferation; if countries are led to believe that advanced nuclear infrastructures will 
create more favorable negotiating positions between them and the U.S., then they are 
unlikely to pursue civil nuclear cooperation with the U.S. while their programs are still in 
their infancy.  
  
5 
THE DRAW OF NUCLEAR POWER 
 
Energy and economy are very closely linked. The United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) described in a 2007 report “strong and proven 
empirical positive correlations between energy and economic growth, and between 
electricity use and economic development.”2 Similarly, the U.S. Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC) notes that “severe energy shortages limit growth 
prospects and impact every aspect of life from food production to access to healthcare 
and education and overall business activity.”3  
It should come as little surprise, therefore, to find that the countries with the 
highest GDP
4
 and GDP per capita
5
 in 2012 also had 100% access to electricity.
6
 The 
methods for generating this vital electricity vary to an extent in and among countries, but 
hydrocarbons (oil, coal, and natural gas) currently dominate the energy industry:  the EIA 
reports that 80% of power generated globally comes from such sources. Nuclear energy, 
in contrast, accounts for a mere 8% of globally-installed capacity.
7
  
 
                                               
2 Staff Working Paper, “Energy, Industry Modernization and Poverty Reduction: A Review and Analysis of 
Current Policy Thinking,” Research and Statistics Branch, United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization, June 2007.  Accessed November 4, 2015, 
http://www.unido.org//fileadmin/user_media/Publications/Research_and_statistics/Branch_publications/Re
search_and_Policy/Files/Working_Papers/2007/WP062007%20-
%20Energy,%20industry%20modernization%20and%20poverty%20reduction.pdf, p. v.  
3 U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation, “Power Africa.” Accessed November 4, 2015,  
https://www.opic.gov/opic-action/power-africa. 
4 World Bank, “Data: GDP (Current $USD).”Accessed November 4, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2012. 
5 World Bank, “Data: GDP Per Capita (Current $USD).” Accessed November 4, 2015,  
data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2012. 
6 World Bank, “Data: Access to Electricity (% of Population).” Accessed November 4, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS?order=wbapi_data_value_2012. 
7 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Annual Energy Outlook 2015 with Projections to 2040,” U.S. 
Department of Energy, April 2015. Accessed November 4, 2015, 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383%282015%29.pdf, p. 15. 
6 
Barriers to Nuclear Energy 
There are a number of reasons why nuclear energy comprises such a small portion 
of global generating capacity (although this number is higher in individual countries such 
as France, where nuclear power plants generate 77% of the country’s electrical output),8 
but two will receive particular mention. Nuclear power plants are, first and foremost, 
costly to build and require a great deal of infrastructure and intellectual capital to operate. 
Second, in the unlikely event that a nuclear reactor suffers a catastrophic failure, the 
resulting damage to the community could potentially be devastating. 
Nuclear power’s cost barrier represents a significant financial burden to the 
private operators of these plants. The construction of a 1,100 MW second unit at the V.C. 
Summer nuclear power plant in South Carolina, for example, is expected to cost $6.8 
billion before it opens for operation in 2019.
9
 To contrast, a 1,200 MW combined-cycle 
natural gas power plant completed in Florida, which began operation in 2013, was built at 
a cost of approximately $860 million.
10
 
Compounding the steep capital costs is the time required to go from the beginning 
of construction to commercial operation; a 2004 report from the Brookings Institution 
identified that “the average lag from groundbreaking to operation had reached twelve 
years” in the U.S. by 1990 (compared to an average of seven years for nuclear power 
                                               
8 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Country Pages: France,” U.S. Department of Energy, 
September 2015. Accessed November 4, 2015, 
http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=FRA 
9 Nuclear Power International, “Summer Nuclear Power Expansion to Cost $6.8bn, Finish in 2019 & 
2020,” Power Engineering, March 13, 2015. Accessed November 6, 2015, http://www.power-
eng.com/articles/2015/03/summer-nuclear-power-expansion-to-cost-6-8bn-finish-in-2019-2020.html. 
10 Russel Ray, “A Report on Combined Cycle Projects in North America,” Power Engineering, February 3, 
2015.  Accessed November 6, 2015, http://www.power-eng.com/articles/2014/02/a-report-on-combined-
cycle-projects-in-north-america.html 
7 
plants built before 1979).
11
 This represents a significant period of time during which the 
power station cannot recover its initial capital cost, which in turn means that an entity 
must be certain that a viable market exists a decade before the expected operational date 
of the nuclear power plant – and that the market will persist for decades afterward. There 
must also be a degree of certainty that a multi-billion-dollar facility will be allowed to 
operate once it reaches completion.  
A second significant barrier to nuclear reactors is an investment climate which 
currently fears the results of a catastrophic failure of nuclear facilities. While documented 
critical failures at such facilities are very few in number, the potential damage that could 
result from a nuclear accident is nonetheless of sufficient magnitude that even a relatively 
mild incident can have far-reaching effects on the global nuclear industry.  
The 2011 Fukushima Daiichi incident in Japan, for example, saw a massive 
earthquake trigger a tsunami which flooded backup generators designed to keep the 
plant’s nuclear fuel cool even in the event the reactors themselves needed to be shut 
down. Three reactors subsequently melted down, leaking radioactive material over a 
significant radius around the power plant.
12
 Following the accident at Fukushima, 
countries across the world saw a significant decrease in the number of applications for 
new nuclear facilities. Japan itself reduced its nuclear capacity to zero, although it does 
plan to restart parts of its nuclear fleet by the end of 2015.
13
 
                                               
11 Pietro S. Nivola, “The Political Economy of Nuclear Energy in the United States,” Brookings Institution, 
September 2004. Accessed November 4, 2015, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2004/09/environment-nivola. 
12 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Backgrounder on NRC Response to Lessons Learned from 
Fukushima,” February 9, 2015. Accessed November 4, 2015, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/fact-sheets/japan-events.html. 
13 Candace Dunn, “Japan Plans to Restart Some Nuclear Plants in 2015 After Fukushima Shutdown,” 
Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, February 11, 2015. Accessed November 
4, 2015, http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=19951. 
8 
Germany, like Japan, announced the end of its nuclear program following the 
Fukushima disaster. Unlike Japan, Germany’s decision involves phasing out its current 
nuclear fleet through the year 2022, at which point no new nuclear facilities are 
anticipated to be approved. Prior to the shutdown, nuclear power represented 
approximately 15% of German electrical capacity.
14
 
Fukushima is not the first incident in a nuclear power plant to cause global 
concern over the safety of nuclear energy. In 1979, in Pennsylvania, Three Mile Island 
Unit 2 suffered a partial meltdown due to a malfunction in the plant’s cooling system. 
While the average radiation exposure to the approximately 2 million individuals in the 
community was less than the exposure of a medical x-ray, the plant was shuttered and the 
event prompted significant changes to the operation and management of American 
nuclear power plants.
15
 
Seven years later, the fatal accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant 
released significant radiation which threatened millions of residents in Ukraine, Russia, 
and Belarus.
16
 It is the first and only (to date) accident at a nuclear power plant which 
resulted in the loss of human life, and the only power plant meltdown which resulted in 
exposure to radiation sufficient to affect the health of plant workers.
17
 These three 
incidents describe the dangers associated with fissile materials, but over the lifetime of 
                                               
14 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in Germany,” November 2015. Accessed November 4, 
2015, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/Germany/. 
15 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident,” December 
12, 2014. Accessed November 6, 2015, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-
isle.html. 
16 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Backgrounder on Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident,” 
December 12, 2014. Accessed November 6, 2015, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-
sheets/chernobyl-bg.html. 
17 World Nuclear Association, “Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors,” August 2015. Accessed November 6, 
2015, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/safety-of-nuclear-power-
reactors/. 
9 
the global nuclear industry such events have proven to be rare – just three such incidents 
during “160,000 reactor-years of operation.”18  
 
Benefits of Nuclear Energy 
Civilian nuclear power has a proven track record of reliability. It has consistently 
been among the cheaper energy alternatives to operate, and its outputs are less harmful to 
the environment compared to hydrocarbon sources. Each of these is a significant draw to 
American companies and to the international community. 
Due in part to the inherent hazards associated with nuclear energy, and also as a 
result of lessons learned over decades of operating these plants, safeguards and protective 
measures in the nuclear industry have grown to address potential failures before they 
occur. This includes multilateral organizations, such as the IAEA’s safety standards, 
which “reflect an international consensus on what constitutes a high level of safety for 
protecting people and the environment” from the use of fissile materials.19 It also includes 
bilateral initiatives, where one country makes the knowledge of its nuclear regulatory 
authority (such as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or NRC) available to ensure 
that the best possible practices are used throughout the world. For example, the NRC is 
“actively involved” in assisting foreign states with the decommissioning of nuclear 
reactors, and maintains “arrangements with many foreign countries which include 
import/export, expert advice, information exchanges, and site visits.”20 
                                               
18 Ibid. 
19 International Atomic Energy Agency, “IAEA Safety Standards,” December 9, 2014. Accessed November 
10, 2015, http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/.  
20 Giorgio N. Gnugnoli, “International Decommissioning Regulatory Initiatives and U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission Involvement,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 2005. Accessed 
November 10, 2015, http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0523/ML052360193.pdf. 
10 
With its long record of reliability, countries which pursue nuclear power are able 
to take advantage of its sizeable environmentally-friendly attributes. In 2004, for 
example, the U.S. power generating sector reduced CO2 emissions by 282 million metric 
tons. Improvements to, and increased generating capacity from, nuclear power plants 
accounted for 54% of these carbon emissions reductions.
21
 This is because nuclear power 
plants produce neither CO2 nor other air pollutants as a direct byproduct of their power 
generating functions.
22
  
The effect of humans on the environment is a particularly sensitive topic in 2015, 
so much so that the Department of Defense’s 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review directly 
lists climate change as a potential threat to future missions.
23
 As such, nuclear power’s 
low carbon footprint makes it an attractive option for the international community.
24
  
Finally, despite the significant capital required to build a nuclear power station, 
the operating costs of the plant are among the lowest of any source of electricity. For 
example, the average cost of electricity to the American residential consumer was just 
over $0.12 per kilowatt hour in 2015.
25
 Nuclear energy in the U.S., to contrast, was most 
recently estimated by the EIA as having a cost of approximately $0.09 per kilowatt hour; 
                                               
21 Power PartnersSM, “The Power PartnersSM Annual Report,” January 2007. Accessed November 10, 2015, 
http://uspowerpartners.org/Reports&pubs/PowerPartners%28sm%29-AnnualReport-Jan2007.pdf, p. 3.  
22 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Nuclear Explained: Nuclear Power and the Environment,” 
U.S. Department of Energy, December 15, 2014. Accessed November 10, 2015, 
http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=nuclear_environment.  
23 U.S. Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review 2014,” March 4, 2014. Accessed November 
10, 2015,  http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf, p. vi.  
24 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear is Part of the Solution for Fighting Climate Change,” November 5, 
2015. Accessed November 10, 2015, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/uploadedFiles/org/Features/Climate_Change/Nuclear4Climate%20Position%20Paper.pdf, p. 1. 
25 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Electric Power Monthly with Data for August 2015,” U.S. 
Department of Energy, October 2015. Accessed November 10, 2015, 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/pdf/epm.pdf, table 5.3.  
11 
so-called “clean coal” power plants were estimated at $0.14, and solar at $0.11 after the 
application of government subsidies.
26
  
That nuclear energy is a cheap generating source (despite the significant 
construction costs) is a highly attractive trait to developing economies. The National 
Rural Electric Cooperative Association, a service organization for a network of energy 
providers across 47 states, released a study in July of 2015 detailing the effects of energy 
prices on the American economy. This study predicted that a mere 10% increase in 
electricity prices across its represented demographic (which primarily supplies 
agriculture and manufacturing) between 2020 and 2040 will cost the U.S. a cumulative 
$2.8 trillion in lost GDP.
27
 Although the study did not weigh in on the economic benefits 
of reducing electricity costs, it notes that increased costs of electricity “reduce the overall 
economic activity” of a region.28 This is consistent with the case of Germany, where 
rising costs of energy due to an increased focus on renewable sources, combined with the 
shuttering of nuclear power post-Fukushima, harmed German economic competitiveness. 
The German government went so far as to revise green energy subsidy laws to combat 
escalating energy surcharges.
29
 
Although nuclear energy is by no means the only solution to environmental 
concerns and rising electricity costs, it is a competitive tool which is recognized 
internationally as one means to provide reliable electricity at a relatively low cost to the 
                                               
26 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Levelized Cost and Levelized Avoided Cost of New 
Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2015,” U.S. Department of Energy, June 3, 2015. 
Accessed November 11, 2015, http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/electricity_generation.cfm. 
27 National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, “Affordable Electricity: Rural America’s Economic 
Lifeline,” July 27, 2015. Accessed November 3, 2015, http://www.nreca.coop/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/Affordable-Electricity-Rural-Americas-Economic-Lifeline.pdf, p. 1.  
28 Ibid.,p. 11.  
29 Matthew Karnitschnig, “Germany’s Expensive Gamble on Renewable Energy,” Wall Street Journal, 
August 26, 2014. Accessed November 11, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/germanys-expensive-gamble-
on-renewable-energy-1409106602.  
12 
consumer. The proof is in continued demand for nuclear power: outside of the United 
States, 60 nuclear power plants are under construction; 160 have either been planned or 
ordered; and 299 have been proposed. Assuming the current rate of expansion, the 437 
nuclear power plants currently in existence will have more than doubled to 983 by the 
year 2030. In 18 of the countries scheduled to receive these, no nuclear power plants 
currently exist.
30
 
According to the Congressional Research Service, approximately “90% of the 
world’s existing commercial reactors (all except heavy water reactors and some gas-
cooled reactors) require enriched uranium fuel.”31 New nuclear reactors are unlikely to 
deviate from this norm, and as such the demand for enriched uranium fuel is likely to 
grow along with the industry. 
 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
The full nuclear fuel cycle is an infrastructure- and capital-heavy construct which 
takes raw uranium to be processed into nuclear fuel. An overview of the process is useful 
for highlighting this fact, and shows why enrichment and reprocessing capabilities may 
be attractive to some countries to increase the security of their nuclear fuel supply. This 
capability, referred to as having a “closed fuel cycle,”32 allows for spent nuclear fuel to 
be reprocessed and reused for the purpose of operating a nuclear power plant. 
                                               
30 "World Nuclear Power Reactors & Uranium Requirements," World Nuclear Association, April 21, 2015. 
Accessed May 20, 2015. 
31 Mary Beth Nikitin et al. “Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy Implications of Expanding Global 
Access to Nuclear Power,” Congressional Research Service (CRS Report no. RL34234), October 19, 2012, 
p. 11. 
32 John Deutch and Ernest J. Moniz et al., “The Future of Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study,” 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003. Accessed November 12, 2015, 
http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/pdf/nuclearpower-ch4-9.pdf, p. 29.  
13 
Nuclear fuel begins as uranium ore processed into “yellowcake,” where the ore is 
“acid-leached to extract uranium oxide.”33 In order to power a light water reactor, 
uranium requires a concentration of U
235
 that is generally between 4% and 5%.
34
 Due to 
uranium’s naturally low concentration of U235,35 this yellowcake must be further 
processed and enriched before it can become fuel. 
Once yellowcake is delivered to a conversion plant, it undergoes a number of 
chemical processes to convert it into uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas. This chemical 
compound contains two uranium isotopes: U
235
, which is lighter and fissile; and U
238
, 
which is heavier and not fissile. At this stage, the UF6 is close to uranium’s natural 
concentration of 99.3% U
238
 to 0.7% U
235
.
36
 
Fission, the splitting of an atom, releases significant amounts of heat.
37
 A higher 
concentration of fissile material allows for more nuclear reactions and thus greater energy 
density. For the average low-enriched uranium (LEU) reactor to produce power from the 
fission process, the concentration of its fissile U
235
 must be significantly higher than the 
naturally-occurring 0.7% – it is typically required to be around 5%.38  
During the enrichment process, UF6 is subjected to one of three methods to 
increase its U
235
 content. During gaseous diffusion, the UF6 is filtered through porous 
barriers in gas form to capture U
238
 particles; when the appropriate U
235
 concentration is 
                                               
33 “Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” p. 8.   
34 World Nuclear Association, “Uranium Enrichment,” April 2015. Accessed June 1, 2015. 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/nuclear-fuel-cycle/conversion-enrichment-and-fabrication/uranium-
enrichment/. 
35 “Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” p. 8.  
36 World Nuclear Association, “Uranium: How does it Work?” March 2014. Accessed June 1, 2015. 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Introduction/What-is-Uranium--How-Does-it-
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37 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Fission (fissioning),” March 20, 2015.  Accessed June 1, 2015. 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/fission-fissioning.html.  
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reached, it is cooled for transport. In the gas centrifuge process, UF6 gas is subjected to a 
strong centrifugal force to pull U
235
 particles toward the center of their housing cylinders; 
this enriched UF6 is then separated from the waste U
238
 to repeat the process until the 
appropriate concentration is reached. Finally, a laser may be employed to target non-U
235
 
molecules to change their chemical makeup; this allows for them to be more easily 
separated to increase the UF6’s U
235
 concentration.
39
 
Only when the UF6 has been enriched can it be turned into fuel. The UF6 arrives 
at a fuel fabrication plant (or less commonly, a separate conversion plant),
40
 where it is 
converted into uranium dioxide (UO2). UO2 emerges as a powder, which is subsequently 
encased in ceramic to form a cylindrical pellet that is traditionally “just under one 
centimetre [sic] in diameter and a little more than one centimetre long.”41  
These pellets are manufactured to be as similar to one another as is possible; they 
are then encased in tubes typically one-half inch in diameter and up to fifteen feet long to 
create a fuel rod, per the specifications of the plant to which they will be delivered. Fuel 
rods are subsequently attached to one another to form fuel arrays, which are similarly 
assembled in aptly-named “fuel assemblies.” These fuel assemblies are specially 
engineered products that are tailored to the needs of a specific power plant.
42
 
Once in the nuclear power plant, and fission is underway, fuel assembly arrays 
begin to lose the sufficient mass of U
235 
which allows a nuclear chain reaction to occur. 
However, plutonium-239 (Pu
239
), a byproduct of the same nuclear reaction, can be 
                                               
39 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Uranium Enrichment,” October 21, 2014. Accessed June 1, 
2015.  http://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/ur-enrichment.html. 
40 “Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” p. 14. 
41 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Fuel Fabrication,” May 22, 2015. Accessed June 2, 2015. 
http://world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Conversion-Enrichment-and-Fabrication/Fuel-
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42 “Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” p. 14. 
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blended with uranium at reprocessing plants to create “mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel” after 
the operating life of a reactor assembly has expired. Globally, MOX contributes to 
approximately 2% of new nuclear fuel production.
43
 
As an expensive and infrastructure-intensive endeavor for any nation, a full 
nuclear fuel cycle is not a particularly common occurrence in the international 
community. Enrichment and reprocessing plants alone, which would allow for MOX 
production, are economically questionable facilities given that “a single large enrichment 
plant can supply up to 25% of the world market,” and that such large commercial 
enrichment plants already exist in Canada, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States.
44
  
 
Research Reactors and Fuel Requirements 
The use and benefits of nuclear material for peaceful purposes is guaranteed under 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
45
 which has near-
universal membership.
46
 However, there is a line between the use of nuclear power for 
peaceful means and for its use as a weapon. The National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA) notes that both nuclear materials “and the facilities used to 
produce them” can be made to support nuclear weapons programs.47 
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47 “Introduction to International Safeguards,” Office of Nonproliferation and International Security, 
National Nuclear Security Administration, April, 2013. Accessed May 22, 2015. 
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When enriching uranium, the “standard measure of enrichment services” is the 
Separative Work Unit (SWU).
48
 A SWU “measures the quantity of separative work49 
performed to enrich a given amount of uranium.” 50 Separative Work Units correspond to 
how much time uranium feed (generally expressed in tonnes or kilograms) spends in a 
centrifuge.  
This is an important definition, as it highlights the fact that the only difference 
between uranium enriched for nuclear reactors and uranium enriched for nuclear weapons 
is the concentration of U
235
, which in turn is influenced primarily by the amount of 
separative work to which it has been subjected. Weapons-grade uranium, which is 
uranium enriched to above 90%, requires no special facilities or processes beyond what is 
required for the average nuclear reactor.
51
  
It is this very principle which makes civilian research reactors a concern from a 
nonproliferation standpoint. More than 700 research reactors have been constructed 
globally, of which 247 continue to operate (with an additional 20 under construction or 
planned as of 2014).
52
 Like any technology, a research reactor is a benign tool on its own. 
In fact, research reactors contribute to “almost every field of science”.53  
Research reactors are typically operated for the radiation they produce as opposed 
to their energy output
54
 (the output of every active research reactor across the world, 
                                               
48 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Glossary: Separative Work Unit.” Accessed May 19, 2015. 
http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=Separative%20work%20unit.  
49 “Separative work” refers to the process of separating U235 from the U238 found in natural uranium. 
50 World Nuclear Association, “Uranium Enrichment”.  
51 Ibid. 
52 “Facing the Challenge: IAEA Support of Research Reactor Sustainability,” International Atomic Energy 
Agency, September 2014. https://www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/NEFW/Technical-
Areas/RRS/documents/14-26471_BRO_Research_Reactors_web.pdf, p. 2.   
53 “Backgrounder on Research and Test Reactors,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 12, 
2014.  
54 Ibid. 
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combined, is estimated at 3,000 MW – roughly equivalent to one civilian nuclear power 
plant).
55
 This radiation can be used for a number of purposes which include:
56
 
 Neutron scattering, to analyze materials on a molecular level; 
 Neutron radiography, which can determine “structural integrity and 
provide quality control for aerospace, automotive, and medical 
components”; and 
 Neutron activation analysis, which can detect trace materials such as 
pollutants or can create radioactive material used in medicine. 
 
These same types of reactors can also be used for education and training purposes. 
In the United States, for example, research reactors exist predominantly
57
 on college 
campuses, and “were initially constructed for nuclear engineering and radiological 
science research and education.”58 There are many peaceful incentives for the pursuit of a 
research reactor. However, these peaceful incentives can be used to mask a weapons 
development program.  
The nonproliferation concern of a research reactor comes from the U
235
 content of 
the fuel required to operate it. Research reactors commonly consume highly-enriched 
uranium (HEU), which is uranium enriched to levels at or above 20%. A small minority 
require weapons-grade uranium for the same, civilian purposes described above.
59
 
Therefore, countries pursuing or operating a research reactor have a reason for requiring 
access to HEU. Notably, the technical requirements for enriching uranium mean that 
enriching from HEU levels to weapons-grade uranium is a significantly less intensive 
process than enriching LEU to HEU levels. 
                                               
55 “IAEA Support of Research Reactor Sustainability,” p. 1.  
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Data from the World Nuclear Association describes the relative work required to 
convert an input of uranium into an output of enriched uranium (Figure 1). The bulk of 
the enriching process (approximately 800-900 SWU per tonne of uranium feed) occurs to 
bring the U
235
 concentration up to LEU levels. To achieve highly-enriched uranium, the 
same input requires only a total of approximately 1,100 SWU – an increase of less than 
one-fourth of the effort required for standard fuel purposes. Once HEU levels are 
achieved, less than 200 additional SWU are required for the same input to be rendered 
weapons-grade uranium. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Separative Work Units required to turn 1 tonne of uranium into enriched 
uranium. The final mass decreases as the uranium becomes more highly enriched.
60
 
 
 
Neither the United States nor the international community is blind to the 
proliferation concerns of research reactor fuel requirements. While the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) states its policy as being “to promote, support and assist 
                                               
60 World Nuclear Association, “Uranium Enrichment.” 
  
19 
Member States in the development and maintenance” of research reactors “for the benefit 
of the nuclear industry and the well-being of humanity,”61 it recognizes the need to 
“minimize civilian use of highly enriched uranium.”62 Similarly, the United States 
Department of Energy launched the “Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test 
Reactors (RETR) Program” in 1978 specifically to assist in converting HEU research 
reactors to LEU fuel requirements; under the RETR Program, 40 such reactors have been 
successfully converted.
63
 
 
Indigenous Enrichment Programs 
Both research reactors and nuclear power have a legitimate need for enriched 
uranium fuels. However, the volumes of fuel required – as previously stated – do not 
necessarily make a fuel cycle logical from an economic standpoint. This is even more 
true in the case of research reactors where, despite their HEU requirements, the volume 
necessary to function is “far less”64  than that of a nuclear power plant. A closed fuel 
cycle is little better, given the low prevalence of MOX fuel globally, and so a country’s 
pursuit of these facilities can function as a red flag that they may be pursuing programs 
that are not peaceful in nature. 
While a red flag is not proof of malicious intent, one conclusion that can be drawn 
from a nation that has minimal nuclear infrastructure yet is pursuing an indigenous closed 
fuel cycle is that economics are not the primary motivation for the enrichment process. 
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Brazil and Argentina, for example, each pursued small enrichment programs that were 
designed to provide a stable supply of enriched uranium “at a cost that is likely 
substantially higher than just procuring these services from large international 
suppliers.”65 The development of indigenous enrichment capabilities in these countries 
began in response to restrictions on nuclear technology transfers following India’s 
decision to detonate an atomic device in 1974.
66
 This suggests that the security and 
stability of supply was a significant factor for these countries, outweighing economic 
factors which would discourage these programs. 
In fact, security of supply is among the stated reasons for Iran’s enrichment 
program. Ali Akbar Salehi, currently the chief of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization 
(and the recipient of a PhD in nuclear engineering from MIT), has publicly identified 
190,000 SWU of enrichment capacity as a core requirement to fuel Iran’s nuclear energy 
and research program “after the end of the [fuel supply] contract with Russia”.67 If this 
assertion can be taken at face value,
68
 then it would logically follow that the fear of losing 
the supply of nuclear material by outside influences is of such a great concern to some 
countries that no price is too high to pay to ensure that a reactor may be fueled, whether 
that price is concretely measurable in hard currency or more abstractly in the form of 
isolation from the international community. 
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Possible Military Dimensions 
On the other hand, Iran also shows that seventy years after the first and only 
nuclear detonations as part of a military campaign, the international community remains 
highly cautious about the circumstances under which a nuclear program is developed. It 
simply cannot be repeated often enough that the technologies remain nearly identical for 
both a peaceful nuclear enterprise and for a nuclear weapons program. This is why the 
openness of the host country is of paramount importance as the international community 
attempts to regulate the spread of such sensitive technologies and materials.  
Unlike Iran, North Korea (DPRK) offers no ambiguity for what its nuclear 
program was designed to achieve. The North Korean nuclear weapons program dates 
back before 1985, when the United States announced that the DPRK was building a 
secret nuclear reactor near the town of Yongbyon – 90km from the capital of Pyongyang. 
North Korea was pressured into signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that 
year, but initially “refused to sign a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), an obligation it had as a party to the [NPT].”69  
An inspections agreement was finally signed between the IAEA and the DPRK in 
1992. By 1993, the IAEA had discovered and subsequently requested access to two 
unreported North Korean locations that were presumed to be storing nuclear waste. These 
requests were denied.
70
 North Korea announced it would withdraw from the NPT in 
1993,
71
 but suspended its decision to withdraw during negotiations led by the United 
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States to deescalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula and dismantle the North Korean 
nuclear program. These efforts appeared to have been successful, with the DPRK 
freezing and planning to dismantle its nuclear infrastructure, and with pledges by the 
United States and South Korea to assist in the construction of a light water reactor to 
contribute to the North Korean civilian nuclear program.
72
  
North Korea became a critical nonproliferation concern in 2002, as it was 
between 1992 and 1994, when the CIA reported that the DPRK was procuring the 
requisite infrastructure capable of producing multiple nuclear warheads on an annual 
basis.
73
 The existence of a clandestine enrichment program was acknowledged by DPRK 
officials that same year.
74
 North Korea has since withdrawn from the NPT as of 2003,
75
 
and detonated nuclear devices in 2006, 2009, and 2013;
76
 the DPRK’s government has 
threatened the United States with nuclear war on multiple occasions in the last year alone, 
likely as a means to bolster its own deterrence posture.
77,78,79
 
The case of North Korea is significant for a variety of reasons, but one which 
shall receive special mention is the fact that its nuclear weapons program ostensibly 
began as a peaceful enterprise. In 1950, the Yongbyon plant was designed with the aid of 
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the Soviet Union as a research reactor. By 1967, the plant was operational. Although the 
DPRK joined the NPT in 1985, safeguards inspections had failed to identify the DPRK’s 
unreported storage sites prior to 1992. Whatever the original intent of the Yongbyon 
plant, by the 1990s it was apparent that North Korea had been capable of stockpiling 
enough weapons-grade plutonium for “one or two bombs.”80   
 
Chapter Summary 
Enriched uranium is one of the most versatile tools that mankind has harnessed to 
date. The use and development of nuclear power for peaceful purposes is guaranteed 
under the NPT, but whether or not enrichment is a similarly-guaranteed right is not 
explicitly addressed by the treaty.
81
 A nuclear fuel cycle being uneconomical for the 
average country, endeavors by a non nuclear weapons state to develop such a closed 
system may suggest that ‘peaceful purposes’ are not the final goal. 
What is truly concerning is how closely civilian and military nuclear technologies 
mirror each other in the development phase. A nation enriching uranium above the 20% 
threshold may be attempting to reduce the threshold to a nuclear weapons program, or it 
may be attempting to fuel a research reactor which requires a denser concentration of 
U
235
 to produce isotopes useful for civilian applications (such as for medical or structural 
engineering purposes). A country could theoretically design a research reactor requiring 
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weapons-grade uranium to operate and, so long as civilian applications are the only result 
of the program, be well within its right under the NPT to require and demand a source of 
fuel for its reactor. 
This is what makes the study of possible military dimensions such an important 
issue. Technologies, tools, and knowledge can be acquired by nearly any international 
actor – it is simply not possible to un-invent the nuclear bomb – but how these actors 
employ these assets is paramount to determining whether or not a malicious program will 
develop. 
Ultimately, unless the nature of the actor can be known and predicted, only the 
control of uranium resources can prevent the occurrence of a new nuclear weapons state. 
Most international nuclear suppliers have prerequisites and requirements to facilitate this 
control, and international safeguards exist to ensure that uranium can be accounted for 
and recovered after it has been supplied. As one such supplier, the United States pursues 
its nonproliferation goals in part through restrictive nuclear cooperation agreements. 
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NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENTS 
 
The current framework for U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements was set by the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. It is specifically Title I, Chapter 11, Section 123 (Section 
123) of the Act which lays down the requirements for an agreement to be concluded with 
a foreign power (and which provides the source of the term “123 Agreement”). Section 
123 outlines nine specific pledges (Appendix) that a collaborating country must adhere to 
in order to secure a 123 Agreement. 
After signing a 123 Agreement, the President submits it to Congress for approval. 
The House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
each receive a copy; by law, the proposed 123 Agreement must be held by these 
committees for 90 days of continuous session. This allows for an appropriate amount of 
time to be allotted for debating the merits and drawbacks of the proposed agreement; 
should Congress find flaws in the agreement, it may submit a bill to disapprove the 
agreement. Without passage of such a bill, however, the nuclear cooperation agreement 
enters into force automatically at the end of the review period.  
Since the 1954 Act was signed, the United States has embarked on a number of 
these negotiations. In total, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) lists 
twenty-four active partnerships as of July 2015 (that number rises to twenty-five with the 
addition of Vietnam).
82
 Among these are nuclear weapons states (such as China and 
Russia), non-nuclear-weapons states (such Japan and Morocco), international bodies 
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(such as the IAEA and the European Atomic Energy Community
83
), and even countries 
that formerly maintained or pursued nuclear weapons (such as Ukraine and South 
Africa).  
The conclusion of a 123 Agreement does not include the transfer of nuclear 
materials, technologies, or data in and of itself. Rather, it serves as a framework which 
authorizes American companies to conduct business with the cooperating Party. Such a 
framework exists “to prevent diversion of U.S. commercial nuclear materials, 
components and technology from their intended peaceful use.”84  
Below are overviews of three 123 Agreements either negotiated or re-negotiated 
by the United States after the “Gold Standard” was established in 2009; Vietnam and the 
U.A.E. are discussed in more detail in the following chapter (see page 36). These 
agreements provide necessary context for the diversity of American negotiating partners 
in nuclear cooperation agreements. 
 
Republic of China 
Among the first 123 Agreements negotiated by the United States, the Republic of 
China (Taiwan) signed a nuclear cooperation agreement one year after the passage of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
85
 Prior to 1979, the United States recognized the 
government in exile in Taiwan as the legal government of China. Following the U.S.-
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P.R.C. Joint Communique in 1979 with the People’s Republic of China (emphasis 
added), the United States instead took the position that “there is but one China, and 
Taiwan is part of China.” This declaration was made to recognize the Communist regime 
in Beijing, where the Chinese Communist Party controls the vast majority of sovereign 
Chinese territory. That being said, the United States was resolved to maintain “cultural, 
commercial, and other unofficial relationships with the people on Taiwan.” Taiwan and 
the United States have since enjoyed a “robust unofficial relationship.”86 
As an entity, Taiwan is perhaps most unique among American nuclear 
cooperation agreements in that it is technically neither a country nor a collection of 
countries; the United States considers the question of the sovereignty of the island of 
Taiwan to be “unsettled.” According to the Congressional Research Service, “the United 
States has supported a future determination of the island’s status in a peaceful manner” 
dating back to a statement made by President Truman in June of 1950.
87
 So long as 
violence does not break out between Taipei and Beijing, the United States is content to let 
the island’s integration with or independence from mainland China progress at its own 
pace. In the meantime, cooperation and contact, of a non-official nature, primarily occurs 
between the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural 
Representative Office.  
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Taiwan’s 123 Agreement was renewed indefinitely in 2014,88 having been re-
negotiated in 2013.
 
To date, the island has maintained a “reliable record on 
nonproliferation.”89 This record, despite Taiwan’s lack of official status, would indicate 
that a truly robust counter to proliferation concerns is adherence to broader international 
frameworks (such as the NPT and IAEA safeguards). Taiwan, a close democratic partner 
of the United States, did include a legally-binding ban on the procurement of enrichment 
and reprocessing technologies in its 123 Agreement.
90
 However, as the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace notes, each of Taiwan’s nuclear reactors is “based on 
U.S. intellectual property,” and Taiwan’s current fuel cycle currently processes uranium 
through American vendors.
91
  
In other words, due to Taiwan’s over-reliance on American supplies and 
technology, the United States is free to mandate that Taiwan continue to not enrich 
uranium. This is not a scalable model for the international community, as the 
international community is far from reliant solely on American-sourced nuclear fuel. 
Furthermore, this ban is consistent with existing Taiwanese legislation that would phase 
out nuclear power on the island altogether.
92
 Applying the “Gold Standard” to Taiwan is 
somewhat of a hollow victory, therefore, as the nonproliferation goals which the United 
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States sought through the “Gold Standard” had been achieved, arguably, decades before 
this 123 Agreement was renewed.  
 
People’s Republic of China 
Negotiated some decades after the agreement with Taiwan, and several years after 
the United States recognized the communist government of mainland China (the People’s 
Republic of China, or PRC), the 123 Agreement concluded between China and the 
United States was signed in 1985. Then, just as now, there were concerns regarding the 
PRC’s proliferation behavior. The waivers required to permit the export of materials and 
technologies to China were not issued until 1998, thirteen years later.
93
 
By the end of that same year, Congress had established the Cox Commission to 
determine whether or not sensitive data had been obtained by China as a result of 
American exports. The Commission released a declassified report in 1999 stating that 
China had ““stolen” classified information on the most advanced U.S. thermonuclear 
warheads,” in operations that dated back to the 1970s and had lasted at least through the 
duration of the Cox Commission. This included information on the entirety of the 
deployed American arsenal; re-entry vehicles; and even submarine-launched ballistic 
missile technologies.
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China itself has expressed interest in being a nuclear supplier.
95
 As recently as 
February of 2015, Beijing had announced that it had assisted Pakistan in developing six 
nuclear reactors.
96
 Such cooperation has spanned the preceding decades into the early 
1990s, and by the end of that decade China was suspected of having provided equipment 
for a heavy water reactor that Pakistan used to produce weapons-grade plutonium.
97
 
As a nuclear weapons state, there are some allowances to be made for how China 
uses material and non-material transfers under a 123 Agreement with the United States.  
However such allowances, as outlined in the exemptions above, describe only the transfer 
of sensitive technologies and technologies that China already possesses (or which would 
not greatly advance Chinese nuclear weapons programs). In theory, a 123 Agreement 
would limit China’s ability to reprocess and enrich fuel and uranium sourced from the 
United States without expressed permission granted by the American government. 
To avoid the hassle of coming to its American counterparts whenever it seeks to 
enrich or reprocess American-sourced nuclear material, an “advance consent” clause had 
been added to the U.S.-China 123 Agreement which Congress reviewed
98
 and ultimately 
allowed to renew in 2015.
99
 This would effectively relieve China from even the most 
basic restrictions of a nuclear cooperation agreement which adheres to the previously-
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established “Gold Standard” of nuclear nonproliferation by granting, as the name implies, 
advanced consent by the American government for the enrichment and reprocessing of 
American-sourced materials.  
Notably, Euratom and India (the latter of which is one of China’s regional 
strategic rivals) both obtained an “advance consent” clause in their respective 123 
Agreements. China likely required the same from the U.S. in order to maintain strategic 
competition with India in particular, and the Administration rationalized the decision to 
include the clause by explaining that rejecting the deal would “leave the United States in 
a weaker position to influence China’s nonproliferation behavior.”100 The Congressional 
Research Service notes that China would only be able to conduct reprocessing of 
American material in “facilities that are under or are eligible for IAEA safeguards,” and 
that the resulting material “may not be for military use.”101 
While the relevance of the “Gold Standard” as it applies to China may seem 
minimal, given China’s status as a nuclear weapons state under the NPT, to the contrary 
it further highlights the disparity between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear 
weapons states as identified by the NPT. If advanced nuclear infrastructure can provide 
more favorable negotiating terms with the United States, then it is likely that countries 
will consider pursuing more advanced infrastructure before attempting to enter into a 123 
Agreement with the United States. This could include the pursuit of enrichment and 
reprocessing capabilities. 
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Russian Federation  
Like the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation is a nuclear weapons 
state. The United States and Russia did not negotiate a 123 Agreement until 2008, nearly 
two decades after the fall of the Soviet Union. This agreement was preceded by a Joint 
Declaration by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin in 2007 
announcing a “bilateral Agreement between the [United States and Russia] for 
cooperation in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy.”102 Both the U.S. and Russia 
sought to expand access by developing nations to peaceful nuclear power, consistent both 
with international law and the goal of nuclear nonproliferation. 
Through this Joint Declaration, both parties would seek to “permit states to gain 
the benefits of nuclear energy and to create a viable alternative to the acquisition of 
sensitive fuel cycle technologies.”103 Building on this key nonproliferation posture 
statement, President Bush submitted the U.S.-Russian 123 Agreement in May of 2008. 
However, the agreement was withdrawn from congressional consideration in September 
of that same year citing Russian military action in Georgia.
104
 
In May of 2010, two years after the Russian-U.S. 123 Agreement was negotiated 
and less than a year after the “Gold Standard” agreement with the United Arab Emirates 
was signed, the Russian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement was once again submitted to 
Congress.
105
 Much of the debate over ratification of the agreement was less concerned 
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with Russian military action, the aggression in Georgia having largely fallen out of the 
public debate, and more concerned with Russian support of Iranian nuclear and ballistic 
missile programs.
106
 This is consistent with the concerns of the 110
th
 Congress in 2008,
107
 
and in fact appears as key points in testimony both from government
108
 and non-
government
109
 congressional witnesses during that period. 
Given Russia’s status as a nuclear energy supplier, it is generally accepted that 
Russia will continue enriching and exporting uranium to countries that both have and 
have not signed 123 Agreements with the United States, thus providing a limiting factor 
for the influence which the United States has in the realm of nuclear nonproliferation. 
However, Russian nonproliferation goals can be complimentary to those of the U.S.  
In 2006, for example, Russia proposed the creation of a “system of international 
centers providing nuclear fuel cycle services.”110 By May of 2007, two months prior to 
the U.S.-Russia Joint Declaration above, Russia and Kazakhstan had agreed to establish 
the International Uranium Enrichment Center.
111
 Its stated purpose, which the United 
States supports, is to “ensure guaranteed supplies of uranium product to countries that 
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have elected to join the Center as an alternative to development of their own 
enrichment,”112 provided that member countries adhere to IAEA safeguards and accept 
nuclear fuel supplies that are exported from the Russian Federation.
113
 As of August 
2015, the member states are Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Armenia.
114
 
The Uranium Enrichment Center coordinated by Russia highlights two very 
important points: First, as with Taiwan and the United States, being the sole supplier of 
nuclear fuel is a key means of dissuading states from pursuing enrichment technologies 
of their own accord. Second, and very much related to the first point, the United States is 
far from the only nuclear supplier in the global community.  
 
Chapter Summary 
The three selected nuclear cooperation agreements above highlight the diversity in 
American nuclear negotiating partners. Taiwan, entirely reliant on the United States for 
its nuclear program, shows that dominance of supply can be a crucial factor in mandating 
limits on enrichment and reprocessing rights. Russia and China, an established and 
emerging nuclear supplier, respectively, are both nuclear weapons states as defined by the 
NPT. In both of these cases, existing enrichment and reprocessing infrastructure as well 
as existing supply relationships between these powers and other countries make banning 
this enrichment and reprocessing capacity untenable politically.  
Each of these agreements was additionally re-negotiated following the 
establishment of the “Gold Standard.” Although enrichment and reprocessing were 
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successfully banned in the U.A.E., attempting to do the same with nuclear weapons 
powers that were, and remain, highly unlikely to relinquish their own nuclear 
infrastructures would likely have been a fruitless effort; this paper does not recommend 
that the United States should have applied the “Gold Standard” to Russia and China. 
However, offering more favorable negotiating terms to nations with advanced nuclear 
infrastructures likely has the unintended consequence of causing less-developed nations 
to pursue their own advanced nuclear infrastructures before turning to the United States 
for assistance. This would allow them to receive the most favorable terms from a 123 
Agreement with the United States.  
36 
ESTABLISHING THE “GOLD” AND “SILVER” STANDARDS 
  
The “Gold” and “Silver” Standards were set, in the realm of nuclear 
nonproliferation, by the United Arab Emirates and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 
Under the “Gold Standard,” the United Arab Emirates agreed to be legally bound from 
enriching or reprocessing uranium on its own territory through the 123 Agreement that it 
signed with the United States of America. This was an unprecedented step in terms of 
American civilian nuclear cooperation; the only other entity to agree to such a ban had 
previously been Taiwan (see page 26). 
When the United States began its 123 negotiations with Vietnam, there was hope, 
particularly from members of Congress,
115
 that the “Gold Standard” would become the 
chief pursuit of American nuclear cooperation negotiations. Instead, Vietnam established 
the “Silver Standard” with a political commitment against enrichment and reprocessing 
that was not legally binding. Senator Bob Corker (R-TN), the Ranking Member of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the time, criticized the Obama administration for 
its “inconsistent and confusing” standards for nuclear cooperation agreements, stating 
that such a track record could potentially compromise “our nation’s nonproliferation 
policies and goals.”116 Through reviewing the text of both 123 Agreements, trends 
between the “Gold” and “Silver” standards can be examined for how well they may apply 
to future negotiations.  
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The U.S.-U.A.E. 123 Agreement 
On May 21, 2009, President Barack Obama submitted the text of the proposed 
nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and the United Arab Emirates 
to the 111
th
 Congress for review, pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954. As a non-nuclear-weapons party to the NPT, the U.A.E. was already barred from 
receiving any scientific or technical assistance leading to the development of a nuclear 
weapon. Even so, the United States determined that “prior to U.S. licensing of exports of 
nuclear material, equipment, components, or technology” or any other nuclear 
cooperation pursuant to the 123 Agreement, the Additional Protocol would have to come 
into force over the U.A.E.’s nuclear program.118 
The Additional Protocol “grants the IAEA complementary legal authority to 
verify a State’s safeguards obligations.” It grants the IAEA information about (and access 
to) the entirety of a state’s nuclear fuel cycle; more latitude, ease of entry into a country, 
and access to communications, for IAEA inspectors; and additional access to information 
and records which make identifying undeclared nuclear sites easier for the IAEA. While 
the Additional Protocol is on the whole more invasive of the host country, the benefits to 
global nonproliferation goals are great enough that 126 countries and Euratom have 
brought the Additional Protocol into force, with an additional 20 countries having signed 
it (with entry into force pending).
119
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Prior to the submission of the text of the 123 Agreement, however, the United 
Arab Emirates had undergone its own internal review of the requirements for a domestic 
nuclear program. The U.A.E. had found that, starting in 2007, annual demand for 
electricity was predicted to increase by 9% through 2020. In a government white paper 
released in 2008 identifying this and other relevant findings, the U.A.E. noted that non-
nuclear, renewable energy sources such as solar would realistically (given the technology 
available at the time) cover approximately 7% of peak daily demand by the 2020 
timeframe. It was therefore decided that nuclear energy would be the most appropriate 
source of electricity for the growing country “as a proven, environmentally promising 
and commercially competitive option”.120 
One very significant portion of the white paper was highlighted in a press release 
by the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Washington, D.C. upon the white paper’s 
release. “Embodied in the UAE policy on peaceful nuclear energy are a pledge to forego 
any domestic enrichment or reprocessing capability in favor of long-term external fuel 
supply arrangements,” it states, along with “a pledge to conclude a number of pertinent 
international agreements, including the IAEA Additional Protocol”.121 The United States 
and the United Arab Emirates released a “Memorandum of Understanding” one day after 
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the white paper was released, stating the U.S. intent to assist the U.A.E. with its nuclear 
program.
122
 
This would seem to imply that talks for nuclear cooperation between the two 
powers predated the completion of the white paper. It is difficult to determine whether 
the philosophy to forego domestic enrichment capabilities came from within the U.A.E. 
or was imposed upon it by its partners throughout the negotiating process, but in the years 
following the 123 Agreement the UAE has been a vocal advocate of the “Gold Standard.” 
Hamad Al Kaabi, the UAE representative to the IAEA in 2012, publicly stated that it 
“does not make sense” for nations developing new civilian nuclear power initiatives to 
pursue enrichment capabilities just months after the Obama administration decided to 
pursue a case-by-case negotiating strategy for enrichment and reprocessing bans.
123
 
Within the 123 Agreement itself, the pledge not to enrich is enshrined in Article 7, 
which states that 
The United Arab Emirates shall not possess sensitive nuclear facilities within its 
territory or otherwise engage in activities within its territory for, or relating to, the 
enrichment or reprocessing of material, or for the alteration in form or content 
(except by irradiation or further irradiation or, if agreed by the Parties, post-
irradiation examination) of plutonium, uranium 233, high enriched uranium, or 
irradiated source or special fissionable material.
124
 
 
The Agreement also specifies in Article 6 that material transferred under the agreement 
may not be enriched or reprocessed without prior approval from the United States, 
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although “irradiation” and “further irradiation” are exempt (as in Article 7).125 An 
exemption of irradiation is likely to allow for the naturally-occurring irradiation of 
plutonium byproduct during the operation of a civilian nuclear power plant.
126
 
Under the Agreed Minute,
127
 the restriction on modifying special or fissionable 
material is further defined to require that such activities take place on the territory of an 
agreed third party.
128
 This would provide a model for other countries to follow by 
showing future partners that all rights guaranteed under the NPT (including those of 
controversial nature such as the modification of special and fissionable materials) could 
be exercised under a multilateral system, so long as unreasonable transfers and 
proliferation concerns can be adequately guarded against. Such a model reinforces 
existing multilateral regimes by its very nature, as these are the regimes upon which the 
123 Agreement will have to rely to ensure that the U.A.E.’s nuclear fuel supply remains 
uninterrupted, and would increase the U.S. stature as a nuclear facilitator.  
For all of the benefits of the 123 Agreement with the United Arab Emirates, 
however, two key drawbacks become apparent. Article 13 of the 123 Agreement governs 
the penalties for violating “the provisions of Article 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10;” the violation of 
IAEA safeguards; and the detonation of a nuclear device by the United Arab Emirates. 
Due to the bilateral nature of 123 Agreements, the United States is limited under the 
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agreement to “requiring the return of any material, equipment or components transferred 
under this Agreement and any special fissionable material produced through their use”.129  
Although options outside of Article 13 exist for taking punitive measures against 
a theoretical violation of the 123 Agreement, such as diplomatic condemnation, 
sanctions, or even military intervention, any response that is not detailed within the 
agreement itself will require support from domestic partners (such as Congress and the 
American people) or that from international partners (such as the European Union for 
comprehensive sanctions regimes to be effective). The Article 13 measures can only 
govern material sourced from American suppliers, and will not require other nations to 
suspend nuclear material transfers should a violation occur. To the contrary, the U.A.E. 
would remain freely able to obtain special and fissionable material from nuclear suppliers 
with less stringent safeguards than the United States requires. 
Second, the terms of the 123 Agreement, although signed and implemented as a 
binding legal agreement, are not final. The Agreed Minute contains a section entitled 
“Equal Terms and Condition for Cooperation” which affirms that the terms of the 
agreement between the United States and the United Arab Emirates “shall be no less 
favorable in scope and effect than those which may be accorded…to any other non-
nuclear weapon State in the Middle East in a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement.”130 
It is logical to conclude that this section of the Agreed Minute played a key role in 
facilitating the enrichment ban undertaken by the U.A.E. Should the United States sign a 
nuclear cooperation agreement with another non-nuclear-weapons Middle Eastern state 
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that is more favorable (which would likely include the definition by the U.A.E. as not 
requiring such a state to forego enrichment and reprocessing capabilities), then the 
U.A.E. could request that the 123 Agreement signed with the United States be revisited to 
renegotiate the terms of the nuclear cooperation agreement, and thus restore its 
competitive status with the remainder of the region.
131
 
Even so, the 123 Agreement signed with the United Arab Emirates stands as one 
of the strictest nuclear cooperation treaties that the United States has negotiated. Drafted 
under the George W. Bush Administration, it was signed under President Barack Obama 
and hailed by the State Department and the President as the “Gold Standard” for nuclear 
nonproliferation. Members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, particularly the 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, were optimistic that this “Gold 
Standard” would become the norm for future nuclear cooperation negotiations.132 By the 
time of the 123 Agreement with Vietnam, however, the “Gold Standard” model of 
nuclear nonproliferation would prove to be an elusive goal that has yet to be replicated. 
 
The U.S.-Vietnam 123 Agreement 
On May 8, 2014, five years after the “Gold Standard” nuclear cooperation 
agreement with the United Arab Emirates, President Obama submitted to Congress the 
text of a proposed 123 Agreement with Vietnam.
133
 Talks surrounding the American-
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Vietnamese nuclear cooperation, however, predate a 2010 Memorandum of 
Understanding signed between the two governments reaffirming “a common commitment 
to the responsible expansion of civil nuclear power”.134 Diplomacy tends to build off of 
previous successes, and so this MOU being signed mere months after the U.S.-U.A.E. 
123 had entered into force indicates that the United States should have attempted to 
pursue a “Gold Standard” agreement with Vietnam as well.  
 It did not, however, and this seems to have been the result of disagreement 
between the Departments of State and Energy. While the State Department under Deputy 
Secretary James Steinberg called “Gold Standard” agreements a “broad policy objective” 
in 2010,
135
 Deputy Secretary Daniel Poneman of the Department of Energy stated that 
same year that requiring “any kind of pledges about what [Vietnam] should or should not 
be doing to their own fuel cycle” would be “inappropriate,” particularly at that stage in 
negotiations.
136
 The disagreement between the two was great enough that the Vietnam 
negotiations were placed on hold while the National Security Council conducted an 
interagency review on the subject of universal application of the “Gold Standard.”137 
Vietnam, according to the Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement submitted 
with the text of its 123 Agreement, has maintained an excellent nonproliferation record. It 
signed the NPT in 1982; entered a Safeguards Agreement into force in 1990; entered the 
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Additional Protocol into force as of 2012, and is party to the Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty (signed 1996, ratified 2006).
138
 In other words, since the installation of 
the Dalat research reactor by the Soviet Union in 1963, Vietnam has been a responsible 
partner in the realm of civilian nuclear energy. This includes the decision by the 
Vietnamese government to modify its research reactor to operate on low-enriched 
uranium, where previously it required high-enriched uranium;
139
 the upgrade was 
completed in 2007
140
 and the last shipment of Vietnamese HEU was returned to Russia in 
2013.
141
 
Such nonproliferation cooperation has not ended at Vietnam’s borders, either. In 
its tenure on the United Nations Security Council (2008-2009), Vietnam supported 
sanctions against both Iran and North Korea for their nuclear programs. It also voted to 
extend the mandate of UNSCR 1540, which “obliges States, inter alia, to refrain from 
supporting by any means non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, 
possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons 
and their delivery systems.” It also imposes binding obligations “on all States” to prevent 
the proliferation of WMDs and WMD delivery systems.
142
 Vietnam subsequently “hosted 
a workshop implementing UNSCR 1540 for countries in Southeast Asia.”143 Despite such 
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a strong nonproliferation record, however, Vietnam ultimately stopped short of binding 
itself under the “Gold Standard.” 
In the Preamble to the 123 Agreement between the United States and Vietnam, 
“the intent of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to rely on existing international markets 
for nuclear fuel services” is affirmed. This, as opposed to the acquisition of “sensitive 
nuclear technologies,” would be Vietnam’s pledge to obtain enriched uranium for its 
power plants.
144
 As a political statement, and not one enshrined within the articles of the 
agreement, the decision by Vietnam to neither enrich nor reprocess uranium is not legally 
binding. It has since been labeled the “Silver Standard” of nuclear nonproliferation.145 
A lack of a legally-binding mandate to forego enrichment and reprocessing is not 
the only significant step back from the “Gold Standard.” Whereas the U.S.-U.A.E. 123 
Agreement would be violated by the enrichment or reprocessing of any sensitive or fissile 
material by the United Arab Emirates, under the U.S.-Vietnam 123 Agreement, only 
material that is American in origin is restricted without prior American consent from 
enrichment and reprocessing. Should Vietnam enrich or reprocess Russian-origin 
material, for example, the United States has no legal grounds to withdraw from the 
agreement and demand the return of what was supplied pursuant to the 123 Agreement.
146
  
What is most striking, however, is the cause cited for withdrawing from the “Gold 
Standard” by President Obama’s Administration. In 2012, the State Department sent a 
letter to Congress detailing a case-by-case policy for enrichment and reprocessing 
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restrictions. The State Department argued that overly restrictive 123 Agreements could 
drive potential cooperative partners to foreign suppliers such as France and Russia. It 
further asserted that consent rights offered through nuclear trade agreements can play a 
critical role in ensuring that nonproliferation regimes are upheld, that U.S. influence 
would be minimized without a wide array of civilian nuclear partner states, and that 
pursuing options other than a case-by-case basis would “[raise] questions about [U.S.] 
reliability as a supplier.”147 
 
Chapter Summary 
Civilian nuclear energy, and indeed any form of cooperative nuclear endeavor, is 
a particularly sensitive subject due to the dual-use nature of the materials and 
technologies involved. Protecting a country’s right to exercise the authorities granted to it 
under the NPT can come at odds with the need of the United States and the international 
community to counter avenues for nuclear proliferation. An interpretation, for example, 
that the NPT confers the right to enrich uranium would allow for a signatory country to 
build enrichment and reprocessing facilities; this would then create another source by 
which enrichment and reprocessing technologies could spread to rogue actors. 
In comparing the agreements that the United States signed with Vietnam and the 
U.A.E., the difficulty of pursuing the “Gold Standard” on a global scale becomes 
apparent. Countries are likely to pursue their own interests which, as in the case of the 
U.A.E., can coincide with the broader needs of the international community. However, 
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Vietnam’s 123 Agreement and the Agreed Minute addendum to the U.A.E.’s 123 
Agreement show that countries are wary of how the global security situation will evolve. 
Vietnam likely does not envision a scenario in which it would have to enrich or 
reprocess nuclear fuel on its own territory in the future, or it would not have pledged to 
forgo this capacity, but the government of Vietnam cannot predict the future. Without a 
legally-binding clause which mandates forgoing enrichment and reprocessing facilities, it 
is in a position to pursue these facilities in the future if the needs of the state require 
doing so. The U.A.E. similarly ensured that it would be able to re-negotiate its access to 
enrichment and reprocessing facilities should such a capacity be granted to its regional 
counterparts. 
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CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO RESTRICT CIVILIAN NUCLEAR 
COOPERATION AGREEMENTS 
 
One key method of tracking the climate of political issues, whether foreign or 
domestic, is to review legislation put forward by the United States Congress on the 
subject. The United States has traditionally supported strong safeguards and verification 
regimes with regard to foreign powers,
148
 and so it is no surprise that Congress would 
seek to further enhance existing restrictions on foreign nuclear partners in the interests of 
the American people. Such are the bills that will be explored below. 
Although it is the role of the Executive Branch to negotiate with foreign powers, 
it does so within the boundaries of law laid out by the Legislative Branch. The role of 
Congress is to advise on and consent to bilateral agreements as negotiated by the 
President. Congress can also establish laws, such as the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, to 
which the Executive Branch must adhere; such laws may be subsequently modified by 
Congress in order to ensure that the best interests of the nation are being represented. 
A number of bills have been selected dating back to the first session of the 110
th
 
Congress (2007). These bills were chosen based on their intent to modify the nuclear 
cooperation negotiating process, either by mandating bans on foreign uranium 
enrichment, or by assuming heightened oversight of the global nuclear trade. In 
examining these bills, a sense of the climate surrounding the U.S. role in cooperative 
nuclear programs can be offered. 
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The 110
th
 Congress was chosen as it creates a baseline which predates the 2009 
“Gold Standard.” This is particularly important, as the attempts by Congress to mandate 
stricter terms for 123 Agreements have traditionally been unsuccessful. Despite what may 
or may not be considered failures in legislation (which is a somewhat subjective 
determination), this will allow for better insight as to how Congress’ vision for the 
American nonproliferation regime has evolved after a cooperative foreign state agreed to 
forego enrichment and reprocessing capacity.   
Bills which have been detailed below do not include every attempt by Congress to 
influence all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle as it relates to the United States.
149
 
However, it is a faithful look at the bills which would have influenced 123 Agreements 
and nuclear fuel safeguards with foreign states between the 110
th
 and 114
th
 Congresses.  
  
S. 1138 (110
th
 Congress, First Session) 
On April 18, 2007, Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) introduced the “Nuclear 
Safeguards and Supply Act of 2007” (S. 1138) to the Senate Floor. Referred to the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, S. 1138 sought to “enhance nuclear safeguards and to 
provide assurances of nuclear fuel supply to countries that forgo certain fuel cycle 
activities.”150 Senator Lugar was joined by Senators Evan Bayh (D-IN) and Charles 
Hagel (R-NE) as cosponsors.
151
 
Title I of the Act makes several foundational observations regarding the nuclear 
fuel cycles of foreign countries. Among these observations is the fact that Congress has 
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“long supported” the assurance of supply of foreign civilian nuclear programs. 
Furthermore, Congress has similarly supported “assistance to the developing world for 
nuclear and non-nuclear energy sources.”152  These are not particularly groundbreaking 
observations, as these items are the basic tenets of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (to which the United States is a signatory).  
Senator Lugar and his cosponsors also asserted the finding that a “reawakened 
interest” in nuclear energy would lead additional foreign states to seek their own “fuel 
cycle facilities and nuclear know-how.”153 They cite a United Nations report154 which 
asserted that “creating incentives for countries to forgo the development of domestic 
uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities is essential” to reducing the risk and 
threat of a nuclear attack, in part by reducing avenues for nuclear proliferation to occur
155
 
(thereby reducing the number of possible instances wherein a nuclear launch could take 
place). Ultimately, Senators Lugar, Bayh, and Hagel would see existing IAEA safeguards 
and the Additional Protocol (which represent “minimum standards”) expanded and 
strengthened, with incentives offered to emerging nuclear powers to keep them from 
producing enriched uranium domestically. 
Consistent with these findings, Title I, Section 102 of the Act would have 
declared the continuation of American policy to provide adequate supplies of nuclear fuel 
to foreign states. Additionally, it would have declared the new policy of simultaneously 
discouraging the development of enrichment and reprocessing technologies among 
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emerging foreign powers, and of encouraging the creation of bi- and multi-lateral nuclear 
fuel supply assurances.  
Title II, Section 202 of the Act would have required the President to submit to 
Congress a report “detailing the feasibility of establishing an International Nuclear Fuel 
Authority (INFA) as called for in section 104 (a)(1) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act 
of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3223(a)(1)).”156 This largely would have been a feasibility report 
providing Congress with the estimated cost, political, and legal barriers to establishing 
such a body. Although this Act would neither establish an international governing body 
nor prohibit foreign powers from enriching, it would have laid the groundwork for “Gold 
Standard” style agreements to become the norm during American 123 Agreement 
negotiations before the agreement with the U.A.E. had been negotiated.  
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations noted in its report that international 
bodies, such as the one laid out in Title II, were generally received favorably by the 
international community.
157
 Furthermore, the Report states that the Act would be signing 
into law a policy which President Bush had articulated several years previously – namely, 
that “the world’s leading nuclear exporters should ensure that states have reliable access 
at a reasonable cost” to nuclear fuel supplies.158 The last action taken on S. 1138 was that 
it was placed on the Legislative Calendar, indicating that it never received a Floor Vote. 
As such, S. 1138 never became law. 
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H.R. 885 (110
th
 Congress, First Session) 
The first version of the “International Nuclear Fuel for Peace and 
Nonproliferation Act of 2007 (H.R. 885) was submitted to the House Floor by 
Representative Tom Lantos (D-CA) on February 7, 2007. Referred to the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, H.R. 885 was drafted in order to “support the 
establishment of an international regime for the assured supply of nuclear fuel for 
peaceful means and to authorize voluntary contributions to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency to support the establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank.” Mr. 
Lantos was originally joined by Representatives Gary Ackerman (D-NY) and Brad 
Sherman (D-CA) as cosponsors.
159
 
Title I of the H.R. 885 found that, since 1946, “the number of countries that 
possess nuclear weapons and the means to create such weapons makes the world less 
secure and stable” due to the increased chance of use posed by such proliferation. The 
Act also asserted that it is in the interest of the global community for the number of 
enriching states to be held to a minimum; financing and constructing enrichment and 
reprocessing facilities in new states was “indefensible on economic grounds alone.” The 
Congressmen asserted, according to Title I, Section 101 of the Act, that multilateral 
nuclear fuel suppliers could “reassure countries that are dependent upon or will construct 
nuclear power reactors that they will have an assured supply of nuclear fuel at current 
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market prices,” so long as said countries agree to not pursue domestic enrichment 
capabilities.
160
 
To further the findings of Section 101 (reinforced in the “Sense of the Congress” 
Section 102), Title II would have authorized voluntary contributions to the IAEA “for the 
purpose of supporting the establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank to maintain 
a reserve of low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel to provide to eligible countries in the 
case of a disruption in the supply of reactor fuel by normal market mechanisms.”161 
Under the oversight of the IAEA, the designated country (which would be a non-nuclear-
weapons state under the NPT) would be unable to have its own enrichment and 
reprocessing programs.
162
   
H.R. 885 passed the House by a two-thirds majority on June 18, 2007.
165
 
However, certain changes were made to the text to reflect amendments by other members 
of the House of Representatives. Primarily, these were clerical changes (for example, 
identifying of the NPT in more specific terms in Title I, Section 101; and removing 
explicit mentions of specific nuclear powers throughout Title I).
166
 The only major 
substantive change involved nuance over how this center would be funding.
167
 
For the Act’s referral to the Senate, Congressmen Lantos, Ackerman, and 
Sherman were joined by ten additional cosponsors, including Representative Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (R-FL), who has been particularly active in attempting to pass legislation 
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designed to restrict the enrichment capacity of foreign states.
168
 Having been referred to 
the Senate, it was read twice before being sent to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. While H.R. 885 never itself became public law, portions of the bill related to 
the establishment of an international fuel bank were enacted under the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act for FY2008 (P.L. 110-161).
169
  
 
H.R. 7068 (110
th
 Congress, Second Session) 
One year after S. 1138 left committee, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) 
submitted the “Western Hemisphere Counterterrorism and Nonproliferation Act of 2008” 
(H.R. 7068). Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, H.R. 7068 sought to 
“bolster regional capacity and cooperation to counter current and emerging threats,” 
“prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons” in the Western 
Hemisphere, and “secure universal adherence to agreements regarding nuclear 
nonproliferation” (along with “other purposes”). Representative Ros-Lehtinen was joined 
by Representatives Dan Burton (R-IN), Connie Mack (R-FL), and Steve Chabot (R-OH) 
as cosponsors.
170
  
Nuclear nonproliferation first appears as a significant topic in Title II of the Act. 
Title II predominantly found against the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, 
and Iran, expressing that these governments may be proliferation concerns in the areas of 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons materials and technologies. To advance the 
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nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Title II would have required the United 
States to implement a much stricter policy toward requiring additional IAEA safeguards. 
This would include opposing the negotiation by any state of a “Small Quantities 
Protocol” (SQP) with the IAEA, which “sets aside many of the operative provisions of a 
general safeguards agreement” and renders the verification process of nuclear materials 
and facilities (that they are not being used or diverted for illicit purposes) “significantly 
impaired.”171 
However, the Act does not end its mandate to the Executive Branch at a stricter 
policy stance. H.R. 7068 would also require the President of the United States  
[To] use all available political, economic, and diplomatic tools to ensure that each 
country in the Western Hemisphere— 
 
(1) has signed and implemented a comprehensive safeguards agreement 
with the IAEA;  
(2) has signed and implemented an Additional Protocol to its safeguards 
agreement;  
(3) guarantees unrestricted access for IAEA personnel to all nuclear-
related facilities;  
(4) has implemented the provisions of United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1540;  
(5) has acceded to, ratified, and fully implemented the conventions 
referred to in section 202(a)(4);  
(6) does not negotiate with the IAEA an SQP if that country did not have 
an SQP as of January 1, 2008; and  
(7) withdraws formally from or renegotiates an SQP agreement if a 
country has such an agreement.
172
  
 
The Act would also authorize sanctions that could be imposed against any 
Western Hemisphere country which did not abide in full with the above requirements. 
Specifically, nonhumanitarian foreign assistance could be ceased with the offending 
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country. Additionally, “the sale, provision, or transfer of articles, including the issuance 
of any specific license or grant of any other specific permission or authority to export any 
goods or technology under” the Export Administration Act of 1979; the Arms Export 
Control Act; the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or “any other statute that requires the prior 
review and approval of the United States Government as a condition for the export or re-
export of goods or services” could be terminated.  
Inherent in the Act, and explicitly stated in Section 205, is opposition to the 
“development or acquisition by any country” of nuclear fuel fabrication capacity by any 
state that did not possess it prior to January 1, 2008. The Act goes so far as to state that 
“all available political, economic, and diplomatic tools” should be used by the President 
of the United States to ensure that such development and acquisition is prevented.
173
 Title 
II culminated in the declaration that any country assisting either Venezuela or Cuba in 
developing their respective domestic nuclear programs would be barred from negotiating 
and licensing exports pursuant to a 123 Agreement with the United States.
174
 
H.R. 7068 was introduced to the House Floor and referred to the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs. The Act did not leave the Committee, and thus does not have a voting 
record associated with it. As such, the Act never became public law.  
 
H.R. 1280 (112
th
 Congress, First and Second Sessions) 
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) made another attempt to influence 
nuclear exports with the 112
th
 Congress on March 31, 2011. A bill introduced “To amend 
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the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to require congressional approval of agreements for 
peaceful nuclear cooperation with foreign countries, and for other purposes,” H.R. 1280 
was referred initially to the House Committees on Foreign Affairs and Rules. 
Representative Ros-Lehtinen was initially joined by Representatives Howard Berman (D-
CA), Edward Royce (R-CA), Brad Sherman (D-CA), Jeff Fortenberry (R-NE), and 
Edward Markey (D-MA) as cosponsors of the bill.
175
 
As introduced on the House Floor, Section 1 of H.R. 1280 sought immediately to 
set a higher bar for concluding 123 Agreements between the United States and partner 
countries. H.R. 1280 would have required 123 Agreement partners to treat all nuclear 
technology, materials, and facilities as American in origin for the purposes of export, 
enrichment, and reprocessing. This in turn would mandate prior U.S. consent for these 
activities. Section 1 would also have amended the Atomic Energy Act to include two key 
restrictions on partner states, namely: 
(10) a guaranty by the cooperating party that no nationals of a third country shall 
be permitted access to any reactor, related equipment, or sensitive materials 
transferred under the agreement for cooperation without the prior consent of the 
United States; and  
(11) if the cooperating party does not operate, as of April 1, 2011, enrichment or 
reprocessing facilities, a requirement as part of the agreement for cooperation or 
other legally binding document that is considered part of the agreement that no 
enrichment or reprocessing activities, or acquisition or construction of facilities 
for such activities, will occur within the territory over which the cooperating party 
exercises sovereignty.
176
 
 
Such an amendment as item (11) above would have been a significant victory for 
the American nonproliferation regime, as it would have required the partner state to 
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affirm the American interpretation of the NPT that there is no inherent right to enrich 
under the Treaty. Item (10), as it is written above, could be interpreted as requiring prior 
American consent even for routine IAEA inspections of American-origin facilities were 
the inspectors themselves not American citizens. Taken together, these two amendments 
to the Atomic Energy Act alone would have firmly declared American sovereignty over 
the global nuclear enterprise, whether or not the United States was prepared to enforce 
such a role, by stating that U.S. law trumps international law among 123 Agreement 
parties.   
Section 1 of the Act as introduced to the Floor would have gone further to restrict 
not just the nuclear programs of partner states, but WMD programs as a whole for those 
nations seeking nuclear cooperation with the United States. It set out as a requirement for 
negotiations that the partner nation had to be a signatory to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, and “all other international agreements 
to which the United States is a party regarding the export of nuclear, chemical, biological, 
and advanced conventional weapons, including missiles and other delivery systems.” The 
same amendment to the Atomic Energy Act would also have required that the partner 
country be “closely cooperating with the United States to prevent state sponsors of 
terrorism” from “acquiring or developing chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or 
related technologies”, or from “acquiring or developing destabilizing numbers and types 
of advanced conventional weapons, including ballistic missiles”.177 
Section 2 of the Act would have mandated “the policy of the United States to 
oppose the withdrawal of any country that is a party to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” Non-humanitarian assistance could not have been 
                                               
177 Ibid. 
59 
provided to any country which withdrew from the NPT. All "material, equipment, or 
components transferred under an agreement for civil nuclear cooperation that is in force 
pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954” would have needed to have 
been returned to the United States under such circumstances, as well as “any special 
fissionable material produced through the use of such material, equipment, or 
components previously provided to a country that withdraws from the [NPT].”178 
Under Section 3, the President would have been mandated by law to compare the 
nonproliferation conditions of foreign countries with which the United States would 
engage in civilian nuclear cooperation with that of the United States. A report would have 
to be submitted to Congress for each 123 Agreement negotiation, detailing “the extent to 
which the exports of each such country incorporate United States-origin components, 
technology, or materials that require United States approval for re-export;” whether and 
to what extent the partner country is investing in American civilian nuclear energy; and 
“any United States grant, concessionary loan or loan guarantee, or any other incentive or 
inducement to any such country or entity related to nuclear exports or investments in the 
United States.”179 
Finally, H.R. 1280 as introduced in the House would have required monthly 
updates by the President to Congress on the status and content of new or renegotiated 123 
Agreements. Congress would also have to vote in the affirmative for a 123 Agreement to 
enter into force. This would have been a substantial change to the current law, which 
enters a 123 Agreement into force so long as Congress does not explicitly vote against 
the Agreement. Having been amended in May of 2012, H.R. 1280 sat in Committee for 
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consideration for several months. On October 1, 2012, it was discharged from the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce to be considered by the whole House of 
Representatives. 
 Several key changes exist between the H.R. 1280 as introduced and as reported. 
First, H.R. 1280 as reported would have struck the requirement in Section 1 that the 
partner country give up its right to enrich uranium. In its place, a “legal regime providing 
for adequate protection from civil liability that will allow for the participation of United 
States suppliers in any effort by the country to develop civilian nuclear power” was called 
for. It would also have eliminated the President’s authority to exempt a proposed 
Agreement that does not meet this requirement.
180
 
This change provides insight to the political climate surrounding nuclear 
cooperation agreements. While the original bill would have imposed key nonproliferation 
restrictions against the cooperating party, amendments to the text favored language on 
providing economic incentives for American businesses. This is likely due to the Obama 
administration’s coming out against H.R. 1280, citing “the bill’s potentially devastating 
effects on U.S. exports, jobs, and the economy.” The Administration similarly asserted 
that the bill would “severely limit the U.S. ability to strengthen nonproliferation 
conditions with other countries.” It is reasonable to conclude that amendments to the bill 
were designed to alleviate the concerns of the Obama administration.
181
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Second, H.R. 1280 as reported added an eighth section entitled “Prohibition on 
Assistance to State Sponsors of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.”182 
Section 8 of the bill would have targeted countries which abused technologies and 
weapons systems, and which were active in the transfer of these items. Rather than 
preventing the spread of nuclear technologies by limiting access to them in the first place, 
these would have been punitive measures designed to deter proliferation offenses from 
occurring.  
Finally, H.R. 1280 as reported added Sections 9 and 10 to the bill as introduced. 
Section 9 would have made it “the policy of the United States to ensure that each country 
that is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should bring 
into force an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.” Whether or 
not a country had an Additional Protocol in force would also be taken into consideration 
when negotiating a 123 Agreement.
183
 Section 10 was a “Sense of the Congress” clause 
which, while not legally binding, would have expressed the opinion of the House and 
Senate that the U.S. would not seek to impose new restrictions on promising cooperative 
countries. Rather, Congress would direct the Executive Branch to selectively pursue 
nuclear cooperation agreements with countries that already were in line with existing 
U.S. nonproliferation policies.  
However, H.R. 1280 as reported was never presented to the Senate. Despite the 
addition of Representatives Dan Burton (R-IN), Jeff Flake (R-AZ), Steve Chabot (R-
OH), and John Conyers (D-MI) as cosponsors, signaling strong bipartisan support, H.R. 
1280 was ultimately not voted on by the full House of Representatives. H.R. 1280 never 
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became law, and the Administration’s efforts to block the bill from advancing likely 
played a key role in this outcome. 
 
S. Res. 269 (113
th
 Congress, First Session) 
On October 16, 2013, Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) introduced a bill on the 
Senate Floor to express “the sense of the Senate on United States policy regarding 
possession of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities by the Islamic Republic of Iran.” 
The resolution, S. Res. 269, was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
Senator Rubio was joined by Senator James Risch (R-ID) as cosponsor. 
Introduced as the Iran nuclear negotiations were gaining momentum, S. Res. 269 
was designed as a “Sense of the Senate” document to express dissatisfaction with the 
Iranian nonproliferation record. Two key findings that Senator Rubio offered when 
drafting this document were boasts by Hassan Rouhani, the President of Iran, that Iran 
had previously been successful at “buying time” for its nuclear programs in the past; and 
the statement of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei “that if Iran ‘intended to 
possess nuclear weapons, no power could stop us.’”186 
Furthermore, Senator Rubio cited Iran’s “decades-long track record of cheating 
on and violating commitments” and its “nuclear and missile programs in violation of 
multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions” when expressing his 
dissatisfaction with the emerging nuclear negotiations. Most notably, however, the text as 
introduced in the Senate stated that “19 other nations currently access peaceful nuclear 
energy without any enrichment or reprocessing activities on their soil,” and asserted that 
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“the Government of Iran could likewise achieve access to peaceful nuclear energy 
without enrichment or reprocessing activities on its own soil.”187 
With these, and other, findings in mind, Senator Rubio expressed for 
consideration the “Sense of the Senate” that 
(1) it shall be the policy of the United States that the Government of Iran will not 
be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon and that all instruments of United States 
power and influence remain on the table to prevent this outcome;  
(2) the Government of Iran does not have an absolute or inherent right to 
enrichment and reprocessing technologies under the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow 
July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (commonly known as the 
“Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”);  
(3) relief of sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program imposed upon Iran by the 
United States should only be provided once Iran has completely abandoned its 
nuclear weapons program, including any enrichment or reprocessing capability, 
and has provided complete transparency to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency regarding its work on weaponization of a nuclear device; and  
(4) until the Government of Iran has taken the actions set forth in paragraph (3), 
Congress should move to pass a new round of additional sanctions without 
delay.
188
  
 
Perhaps most relevant to the topic of the “Gold Standard” would have been Item 
(2) above, which states in no uncertain terms that the NPT does not inherently confer the 
“right to enrich” upon any signatory. While the interpretation of the remainder of the 
“Sense of the Senate” clause can reasonably be said to speak to Iran specifically, the 
invocation of the NPT would likely have served as a wider signal regarding American 
foreign policy that the United States’ commitment to limiting enrichment globally had 
not wavered. This would have been highlighted with financial incentives for Iran to agree 
to the American position that enrichment was not its inherent right: the relief of sanctions 
in exchange for dismantling its enrichment and reprocessing capacity.  
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S. Res. 269 ultimately received moderately strong partisan support among 
Republican Senators. By the end of the 113
th
 Congress, Senator Rubio was joined by 
Senators James Inhofe (R-OK), John Cornyn (R-TX), Mark Kirk (R-IL), Roy Blunt (R-
MO), David Vitter (R-LA), Pat Roberts (R-KS), Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Michael Enzi (R-
WY), Chuck Grassley (R-IA), Mitch McConnell (R-KY), and Ted Cruz (R-TX).
189
 
However, the nuclear negotiations that were occurring with Iran at the time likely had a 
negative impact on the bill’s passage; the negotiating power of the President would have 
been impacted by the passage of this “Sense of Congress,” and so the Executive Branch 
would have devoted considerable effort to defeating the bill.  
 
S. J. Res. 36 (113
th
 Congress, Second Session) 
On May 22, 2014, Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) submitted a resolution on the 
Vietnamese 123 Agreement for consideration by the Senate. “Relating to the approval 
and implementation of the proposed agreement for nuclear cooperation between the 
United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,” S. J. Res 36 was designed to set a 
fixed, thirty-year window on America’s global civilian nuclear exports. 190  
Section 1 of the resolution as introduced in the Senate would have given 
Congress’ explicit approval for the 123 Agreement with Vietnam.191 Under Section 2, the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 would be amended such that “no license to export pursuant 
to an agreement that has entered into force pursuant to the requirements of such section 
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123 may be issued after the date that is 30 years after the date of entry into force of such 
agreement.”192 The resolution would also have eased the renewal process for 123 
Agreements, by allowing Congress to “enact a joint resolution permitting the issuance of 
such licenses for an additional period of not more than 30 years” without requiring the 
submission of a new 123 Agreement by the President of the United States.
193
 
S. J. Res 36 garnered the support of two cosponsors during its time being debated 
in the Senate. Senators Tim Kaine (D-VA) and Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) signed on as 
cosponsors in June of 2014. By August of the same year, the joint resolution had 
successfully passed the Senate. It was referred in the House, and submitted to the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
As referred, the resolution had been amended to strengthen congressional 
oversight of the nuclear export process. In Section 2, the language of the text struck 
references to export licenses in favor of mandating that “no funds may be used to 
implement any aspect of an agreement for civil nuclear cooperation” after a duration of 
thirty years had passed. Additionally, the President would have to certify “within the final 
five years of the agreement” that the terms and conditions of the agreement had been 
upheld by the partner state, and “that the agreement continues to be in the interest of the 
United States.” Congress would then pass a resolution allowing the cooperation 
agreement to continue for an additional thirty-year period.
194
 
Under the resolution as introduced, Section 2 exempted “any agreement with a 
country that is a member country of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or Australia, 
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Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, the Taipei Economic and Cultural 
Representative Office in the United States (TECRO), or the International Atomic Energy 
Agency” from the thirty-year limitation and renewal requirements.195 As referred in the 
House, however, only TECRO and the IAEA would be exempt.
196
 In both versions, 
agreements entered into prior to August 1
st
, 2014, would be exempt from the 
requirements of S. J. Res 36, allowing the previously-negotiated end terms to conclude 
before said agreements would fall under the jurisdiction of the revised renewal 
requirements. 
Finally, Section 3 as introduced in the Senate was struck and incorporated into 
Section 2 as referred in the House above. Section 4 as referred in the House added 
reporting requirements for Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statements (NPAS), 
pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Although the NPAS is 
required to be submitted, in classified and unclassified formats, to the President, Section 
4 as referred would have required that the NPAS be submitted also to “the appropriate 
congressional committees.” This submission would largely have included background 
information on the nuclear posture of the potential partner state.
 197
 
Some of the information requested is, in fact, rather basic in terms of the context 
of agreement ratification. For example, the “assessment of the consistency of the text of 
the proposed agreement for cooperation with all the requirements of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954” is in part the purpose of assembling the congressional committee in the first 
place.
198
 This would seem to indicate the need of the congressional body for a 
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homogenous source of information detailing the nonproliferation concerns regarding the 
potential partner country.  
Other items as would have been required by the resolution would seem to serve 
the American public in terms of ease of access to information. “A historical review and 
assessment of past proliferation activity of the cooperating party” combined with “list of 
all the treaties and agreements related to non-proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction to which the cooperating party is also a party” (and the domestic laws 
governing WMD proliferation issues) would have been entered into the Congressional 
Record,
199
 which is a public document to which the American people would have access. 
Given Congress’ role in advising and consenting to treaties with foreign powers, and its 
mandate to be the voice of the American people, this would have given the opportunity 
for the American people themselves to be more informed about such agreements. This, of 
course, would only have applied to the unclassified NPAS – the classified annex would, 
as the name implies, have remained restricted to those with the appropriate clearance and 
access. 
Despite the support it garnered in the Senate, S. J. Res. 36 failed to receive 
traction in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. It was never voted on by the full 
House floor, and thus did not advance for signature by the President. Although the Act 
never became public law, and the proposed amendments to the Atomic Energy Act were 
not codified, by law passage in the Senate was sufficient to enact the proposed nuclear 
cooperation with Vietnam. 
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Chapter Summary 
Congress’ attempts to mandate stricter terms within 123 Agreements do not 
appear to have primarily been motivated by the “Gold Standard” signed with the United 
Arab Emirates. Rather, they appear to be motivated by a desire for heightened oversight 
over the global nuclear fuel cycle. This would include stricter safeguards for 123 
Agreement parties. In some cases, it would also have included enforcing safeguards 
restrictions against countries that had not signed a 123 Agreement. 
Senator Lugar’s bill in the 110th Congress is an example of one such bill. By 
offering a program to secure global access to nuclear fuel supplies, S. 1138 would have 
incentivized the removal of domestic enrichment programs globally by offering a neutral, 
third party medium that would take custodianship of fuel for nuclear reactors. The 
additional reporting requirements and use of American funds (invoking Congress’ 
“Power of the Purse”) would have ensured congressional oversight over this proposed 
international body. 
As the bills reviewed were written, they can be interpreted as representing a 
viewpoint that without signing a 123 Agreement with the United States, a foreign power 
seeking nuclear fuel and a civilian nuclear program will be greatly hindered in this 
pursuit. If this is the case, then such attempts at drafting law will likely fail: the United 
States is far from the only nuclear supplier, and making stricter the requirements for 
conducting business with the United States will likely serve only to make the United 
States a less lucrative supplier in the nuclear trade. This was the Obama administration’s 
argument in the 2012, when the Departments of State and Energy informed Congress in 
part that “France and Russia in particular are very aggressive in pursuing nuclear 
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business worldwide, and offer favorable terms. Neither imposes [enrichment and 
reprocessing] conditions in their agreements.”200 
In balancing nonproliferation concerns with economic considerations from 2007-
2015, Congress has highlighted a negotiating environment wherein the barrier to entry for 
civilian nuclear cooperation with the U.S. has been relaxed to allow for a larger number 
of potential cooperative partners. Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the 
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and former Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy 
in the Department of Defense, characterized this idea that “nuclear salesmanship should 
supersede security” as highly misguided.201 It has further been argued that countries 
seeking the “U.S. stamp of approval” for their nuclear programs would have kept demand 
for 123 Agreements high, thus negating the need to make these agreements attractive 
from a largely economic standpoint.
202
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CONCLUSION: IRAN, THE JCPOA, AND FUTURE NUCLEAR 
NEGOTIATIONS 
 
In July of 2015, Iran signed an international agreement to suspend portions of its 
nuclear program. Although not a 123 Agreement, and although the U.S. will not be 
authorizing the transfer of nuclear materials to Iran as a result of the agreement, it is 
nonetheless an important event in American nuclear negotiations. The U.S. has long 
attempted to halt the spread of military nuclear programs, and so any concessions made 
to Iran, a rogue actor in the international community, are likely to be sought by 
cooperative partners abroad in future nuclear negotiations.  
 
Development of the Iranian Nuclear Program 
In 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower addressed the United Nations General 
Assembly to propose the establishment of an international atomic energy agency. Under 
the direction of the U.N., this body (which ultimately became the IAEA) would “be made 
responsible for the impounding, storage and protection of the contributed fissionable and 
other materials.” Its “special purpose” would be to provide global access to nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes.
203
  
On March 25, 1957, Iran and the United States signed an agreement regarding the 
cooperative use of civilian nuclear power under the Atoms for Peace program.  Entered 
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into force in 1959, the agreement made it possible for the United States to supply Iran 
with a research reactor. Construction of this facility began in 1960.
204
    
The United States supplied weapons-grade uranium to fuel the reactor beginning 
in 1967,
205
 but banned transfers of highly enriched fuels to the country following the 
1979 Islamic Revolution; Iran maintains a stockpile of U.S.-origin nuclear material that 
was never returned.
206
 In the years between the establishment of peaceful cooperation and 
the revolution, however, Iran went to great effort to show the international community 
that it was pursuing a peaceful program.  
In 1968, the NPT was first made available for countries to sign. Iran did so that 
same year, and ratified the treaty in 1970.
207
 Four years later, Iran led an effort to 
establish a Middle East nuclear-weapons-free zone.
208
 Even after the revolution, Iran 
made attempts to show its willingness to abide by international norms; in 1987, Iran 
struck a bilateral agreement with Argentina to convert the Tehran Research Reactor to 
use fuel enriched to just under 20% instead of weapons-grade uranium. Tehran Research 
Reactor has been operating with this LEU since 1993.
209
  
Despite these noteworthy efforts, however, the international community has found 
multiple reasons to be concerned with the Iranian nuclear program. The U.S. Intelligence 
Community expressed in 1974 that Iran likely harbored nuclear weapons ambitions, 
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noting that “Iran’s course will be strongly influenced by Indian nuclear programs.”210 The 
pre-revolutionary government of Iran worked to develop a full nuclear fuel cycle, to 
include enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.
211
 Concerns about the Iranian nuclear 
program grew to the point that the western states (including the U.S.) “in the shadow of 
India’s successful nuclear test in May 1974,” withdrew support for it.212  
These concerns grew, for the U.S. in particular, following the Iranian Revolution 
and the ascension of a government that was vehemently anti-American in nature. 
Although Iran suspended its nuclear program in 1979,
213
 the Arms Control Association 
notes that Iran “views the United States as the central threat to its continued existence and 
as the greatest obstacle to its regional ambitions,” and that “Tehran’s efforts to develop a 
possible nuclear weapons capability should therefore be viewed through the prism of its 
rivalry with the United States.”214  
 Iran’s nuclear program suspension lasted for approximately three years; the 
Central Intelligence Agency reported that Iran restarted its program in 1982. In its report, 
the CIA stated that “Iran does not pose a weapons proliferation threat at this time,” but 
that uranium enrichment and reprocessing programs started prior to the Islamic 
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Revolution “could provide a foundation for future weapons development.”215 If Iran is 
driven by a desire to achieve a sense of strategic balance with the U.S., and if it is 
developing weapons, then the U.S. and its allies would likely be the target of an Iranian 
nuclear weapons program. 
In 1987, Iran received schematics for constructing uranium enrichment 
centrifuges through the A. Q. Khan network. Five years later, the U.S. Congress passed 
“the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992, which prohibits the transfer of 
controlled goods or technology that might contribute “knowingly and materially” to 
Iran’s proliferation of advanced conventional weapons.” It passed the Iran-Libya 
Sanctions Act in 1996, penalizing American and foreign entities which invested $20 
million or more in the Iranian energy sector within the space of one year.
216
   
Despite these sanctions, the Iranian nuclear program progressed undeterred. 
Reports surfaced by 2002 that Iran was hiding secret nuclear facilities in Natanz (uranium 
enrichment) and Arak (plutonium production). The IAEA became involved soon after. 
While Iran was initially cooperative in the IAEA’s inspections, the IAEA found Iran to 
be noncompliant with its NPT safeguards agreement. Key to this noncompliance was 
Iran’s “hiding [of] a wide range of strategic nuclear work.”217  
In July of 2006, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) announced its 
concerns that, despite three years of inspections, the IAEA was “unable to provide 
assurances about Iran’s undeclared nuclear material and activities.” The UNSC adopted 
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resolution 1696, requiring Iran to “suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing 
activities,” and allowed one month for compliance before Iran would “face the possibility 
of economic and diplomatic sanctions.” Iran, in response, reiterated its position that its 
program was peaceful in nature, and further stated that no ties between its facilities and a 
nuclear weapons program had been described by the IAEA.
218
  
By 2008, the UNSC had imposed strong sanctions against Iran and had authorized 
countries to board and inspect Iranian-flagged vessels in order to prevent shipments of 
nuclear materials and technologies to the state from occurring. Iran admitted in 
September of 2009 to constructing and maintaining a secret nuclear facility at Fordow. 
Unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States against Iran grew increasingly severe 
through 2013, as Iran consistently defied the UNSC
219
 and as President Obama regularly 
reiterated that the United States was “committed to preventing Iran from acquiring 
nuclear weapons.”220  
 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
On November 24, 2013, the five permanent members of the UNSC and Germany 
(P5+1) signed an agreement with Iran called the “Joint Plan of Action” (JPOA). The 
JPOA was designed to, over the course of six months, move to freeze the Iranian nuclear 
program until a comprehensive deal could be reached with Iran that would preclude the 
                                               
218 Press Release, “Security Council Demands Iran Suspend Uranium Enrichment by 31 August, or Face 
Possible Economic, Diplomatic Sanctions,” United Nations Security Council, July 31, 2006. Accessed 
November 15, 2015, http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8792.doc.htm.  
219 Patrick Christy and Robert Zarate, “FPI Fact Sheet: Timeline on Diplomacy and Pressure on Iran’s 
Nuclear Program,” Foreign Policy Initiative, July 7, 2014. Accessed November 15, 2015, 
http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/timeline-diplomacy-and-pressure-irans-nuclear-program.  
220 Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President at the AIPAC Policy Conference 2011,” The 
White House, May 22, 2011. Accessed November 15, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/05/22/remarks-president-aipac-policy-conference-2011.  
75 
country from developing nuclear weapons. Extended for an additional six months in July 
of 2014, and again in November of the same year until June of 2015, the JPOA in part 
halted the enrichment of Iranian UF6 above 20%; required the facilitation of daily access 
for IAEA inspectors to Natanz and Fordow; and required Iran to refrain from 
constructing new enrichment sites. In return, the P5+1 repatriated $4.2 billion (USD) to 
Iran, and agreed to not impose new nuclear sanctions against the state (whether from the 
U.S., the U.N., or the E.U.).
221
    
The culmination of the JPOA was the similarly-titled “Joint Comprehensive Plan 
of Action” (JCPOA), which was signed between the P5+1 and Iran on July 14, 2015.  
Designed to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program evolves for peaceful purposes, the 
JCPOA promises “comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as 
multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme” in return for 
“comprehensive measures providing for transparency and verification.”222 
However, the JCPOA was met immediately with criticism that it allowed Iran too 
much freedom to operate its nuclear industry. The JCPOA was allowed to pass through 
Congress largely on party lines (with Democrats supporting the President and 
Republicans against), but even Democratic supporters were hesitant to endorse it: House 
Democratic Whip Steny Hoyer (D-MD) went on record to say that the agreement was 
“not one which I would have negotiated, nor one I think should have been agreed to,” 
stating that it “gives too much to Iran and demands too little in return.”223 Part of this 
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concern comes from the very idea of relieving nuclear-related sanctions; in a letter signed 
by 344 members of the House of Representatives, it was noted that “[a]lmost all 
sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program are also related to Tehran’s advancing 
ballistic missile program, intensifying support for international terrorism, and other 
unconventional weapons programs.”224  The United States would de facto allow funding 
for these activities by suspending or removing sanctions related to the nuclear program, 
given the significant overlap between them. 
Perhaps most relevant to the issue of the “Gold Standard” comes from the 
Administration’s stance regarding the JCPOA. As the chief negotiating party on behalf of 
the U.S., the Obama administration was very pleased with the outcome of the Iran deal, 
noting that the JCPOA “blocks the four pathways to a nuclear weapon.” The tradeoff is 
that the JCPOA provides by default consent for Iran’s enrichment program, and allows 
Iran to keep more than 6,000 centrifuges for enriched uranium production.
225
    
This is in stark contrast to, and entirely incompatible with, the “Gold Standard” 
statement of 2009, where the U.A.E. was praised for entirely forgoing enrichment and 
reprocessing capacities. To subsequently hail the JCPOA as being “the strongest non-
proliferation agreement ever negotiated”227 is to tacitly declare that enrichment and 
reprocessing capabilities are not inherent proliferation risks.  
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August 5, 2015. Accessed August 28, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/08/05/remarks-president-iran-nuclear-deal.  
77 
Conclusion 
In the nearly six years following the signing of the 123 Agreement between the 
United States and the United Arab Emirates, the “Gold Standard” has not been 
aggressively pursued. This is the opinion of Senator Corker, who  describes an 
“administration [that] appears to have walked away from this “Gold 
Standard”…compromising our nation’s non-proliferation policies and goals.”229 In 
fairness to the administration, it is likely that if President Obama believed that the “Gold 
Standard” was vital to U.S. nonproliferation goals, then the Departments of State and 
Energy would not have clearly eschewed it in 2012 in favor of a case-by-case policy.
230
  
Additionally, whether or not the United States can return to the “Gold Standard” 
is a separate question from whether or not it should. The Department of State makes a 
valid argument in identifying competition in the global nuclear trade as a reason to not 
pursue strict adherence to the “Gold Standard.” Russian involvement in Vietnam’s 
nuclear infrastructure, for example, predates that of U.S. involvement. Nuclear fuel 
supply and construction initiatives already existed in Vietnam, and would continue to 
exist even if the United States withdrew its support of the Vietnamese nuclear endeavor. 
Without a 123 Agreement, U.S. influence in Vietnamese civilian nuclear infrastructure 
would at best be minimal. 
This lends credence to the notion that Congress repeatedly failed to amend 
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 because it could not reach a consensus on 
how to strengthen the American nonproliferation regime without sacrificing opportunities 
for the U.S. to remain competitive in the development of civilian nuclear infrastructure in 
                                               
229
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foreign states. If so, then it is likely that the U.S. will remain unable to achieve the “Gold 
Standard”: a greater breadth in the number of countries signing 123 Agreements was 
outlined in the Departments of State and Energy’s letter to Congress in 2012 as being a 
key policy objective.
231
 As a 123 Agreement is an authorization framework to allow the 
transfer of nuclear facilities, materials, and technologies, the U.S. could choose to pursue 
greater restrictions on top of the standard 123 Agreement with countries that it 
determines require additional safeguards once the actual transfers are to take place. 
A similar precedent is highlighted in the recently-announced Iran nuclear deal. 
Among the concessions and requirements of the deal, Iran is to keep portions of its 
enrichment capacity intact.
232
 Despite this unofficial validation of Iran’s enrichment 
capabilities, President Barack Obama subsequently called the Iran deal “the strongest 
non-proliferation agreement ever negotiated.”233 In labeling the deal as such, a shift in 
negotiating priorities becomes evident: total bans on enrichment and reprocessing are 
lifted in favor of other concessions, yet as an outcome of nuclear negotiations the deal is 
stronger than the “Gold Standard.”   
This departure from the “Gold Standard” will likely affect future 123 Agreements. 
Countries within the international community are unlikely to accept greater restrictions 
on their civilian nuclear infrastructures than were applied to rogue actors. Iran has 
highlighted what nuclear-weapons states under the NPT have understood for decades: an 
advanced nuclear infrastructure grants much greater leeway for negotiating with nuclear 
powers. The rapid shift in U.S. nuclear negotiating policy between 2009 and 2012 as 
                                               
231 Ibid. 
232 “Full Text of the Iran Nuclear Deal,” The Washington Post, July 14, 2015. Accessed August 28, 2015, 
http://npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1139&rt=&key=poneman&sec=article&author=, p. 6.  
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stated by the Departments of State and Energy likely signaled to foreign states that 
enrichment and reprocessing capabilities were achievable under the right circumstances. 
From 2012 to 2015, nuclear negotiations were dominated by two nuclear weapons 
states and a rogue actor. In the cases of China, Russia, and Iran, advanced nuclear 
infrastructures likely made maintaining enrichment and reprocessing capabilities 
plausible outcomes for their respective negotiating teams. President Obama is somewhat 
complicit in creating this atmosphere; his remarks that “no deal” with Iran would be 
worse than the worst-case scenario under the JCPOA
234
 echoes statements made by the 
administration during the Chinese 123 renegotiation, and will likely make future 
negotiating partners unwilling to accept severe restrictions to their enrichment and 
reprocessing capabilities.  
                                               
234 Washington Post Staff, “Full Text: Obama: ‘It Would Be Irresponsible to Walk Away From’ Iran 
Nuclear Deal,” Washington Post, July 14, 2015. Accessed November 20, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/07/14/full-text-obama-it-would-be-
irresponsible-to-walk-away-from-iran-nuclear-deal/. 
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APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF SECTION 123 OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT 
OF 1954 
 
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 lists nine pledges by which partner countries 
must abide. They are outlined as follows:
235
 
1. A guarantee of safeguards for all material and equipment – obtained, used, 
and/or produced – provided subsequent to the conclusion of a nuclear 
cooperation agreement. This guarantee is indefinite, and extends beyond 
the natural or artificial lifetime of the treaty. 
2. If the Party is a non-nuclear-weapons state, all nuclear material for any 
peaceful purpose anywhere in the cooperating Party’s sovereign territory 
must be subjected to IAEA safeguards. This includes material that is not 
American in origin. 
3. A guarantee that no material, equipment, or data will be used in the pursuit 
of detonating a military nuclear device; or for any military purposes. An 
exemption exists under subsection 91c of the Act for “nonnuclear parts of 
atomic weapons” provided to states that have “made substantial progress 
in the development of atomic weapons” so long as such a transfer does not 
“contribute significantly to that nation’s atomic weapon design, 
development, or fabrication capability.”236 
4. The United States will maintain the right to demand the return of any 
nuclear materials and equipment transferred under the Agreement, and of 
any material produced as a result of the Agreement, should the 
                                               
235 “Atomic Energy Act of 1954”, As Amended (P.L. 83-703). Article 1, Chapter 11, Section 123. Accessed 
July 7, 2015 via the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/governing-laws.html.  
236 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Article 1, Chapter 9, Section 91, Subsection (c). 
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cooperating Party detonate a nuclear device. Exemptions exist for 
Agreements formed under subsection 91c (see point #3 above), and for 
nuclear weapons states.  
5. A guarantee that any materials transferred pursuant to the Agreement will 
not be re-transferred to any unauthorized Party without the explicit 
consent of the United States. The following exemptions may apply: 
a. Subsection 91c (see point #3 above); 
b. Subsection 144b: Authorization of the President to cooperate with 
a nation or regional defense organization (where the United States 
is a member), communicating restricted data for expressed 
purposes of training, evaluation, defense planning, and developing 
delivery systems. The President of the United States must 
determine that such an arrangement “will not constitute an 
unreasonable risk to the common defense and security” of the 
United States and the international community. This exemption 
cannot be made independent of a 123 Agreement;
237
 
c. Subsection 144c: Communication of restricted data to improve 
atomic weapons design, provided that the cooperating Party has 
made substantial progress in their development already. 
Additionally, the communication of restricted data for military 
reactors should they not constitute an unreasonable risk to the 
                                               
237 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Article 1, Chapter 9, Section 144, Subsection (b).  
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common defense and security. This exemption similarly cannot be 
made independent of a 123 Agreement;
238
 
d. Subsection 144d: The communication of restricted data to support 
a program to control and account for fissile and weapons material; 
“control of and accounting for atomic weapons”; verifying of 
treaties; and establishing international standards for classifying 
data related to atomic weapons and fissile material. This must 
promote the common defense and security, and may not pose an 
unreasonable risk to the same. Like Subsection 144b and 1441c 
exemptions, this cannot be undertaken independent of a 123 
Agreement.
239
 
6. The cooperating Party must guarantee that nuclear materials produced or 
received pursuant to this Agreement and relevant nuclear facilities will be 
placed under adequate physical security. 
7. A guarantee that no materials transferred or processed pursuant to this 
Agreement will be reprocessed, enriched, “or otherwise altered” without 
the expressed consent of the United States. Exemptions exist under 
subsections 91c (see point #3 above), 144b, 144c, and 144d (see point #5 
above, sub-bullets (b), (c), and (d) respectively). 
8. A guarantee by the cooperating Party that plutonium, U233, and uranium 
enriched above 20% U
235
 transferred or produced pursuant to this 
Agreement will not be stored in any facility without the expressed, prior 
                                               
238
 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Article 1, Chapter 9, Section 144, Subsection (c).  
239 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Article 1, Chapter 9, Section 144, Subsection (d).  
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approval of the United States. Exemptions exist under subsections 91c 
(see point #3 above), 144b, 144c, and 144d (see point #5 above, sub-
bullets (b), (c), and (d) respectively). 
9. A guarantee that all materials, data, facilities, and equipment transferred, 
and any material produced using the aforementioned transfers, will be 
subjected to all requirements laid out in Section 123. The President may 
make exemptions under subsections 91c (see point #3 above), 144b, 144c, 
and 144d (see point #5 above, sub-bullets (b), (c), and (d) respectively), if 
such an exemption would prevent jeopardizing either the common defense 
and security, or American nonproliferation goals.  
a. Except in the cases of the aforementioned exemptions, the 
Secretary of State will be the primary negotiator for a 123 
Agreement.  
b. Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statements must include a 
classified annex with the consultation of the Director of Central 
Intelligence to summarize relevant, classified information. An 
unclassified version shall be provided to the President analyzing 
the consistency of the proposed treaty with the requirements of 
Section 123, and analyzing the safeguards and control mechanisms 
of the cooperating Party.  
c. Under the aforementioned exemptions, proposals will be submitted 
by either the Secretary of Energy or the Secretary of Defense, as 
applicable. 
